DARWIN ON THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIENCE. 127 



THE LECTURE. 



It has been well said that the question as to the 

 origin of conscience has the same relation to modern 

 philosophical discussion of religious truths that Bce- 

 otia had to the geography of Greece. That province 

 was the key to the whole land. It became, conse- 

 quently, the very dancing-plot of Mars. We have 

 had many a theory put to such straits in explaining 

 the single syllable ought, as to assert with Bentham 

 that, "if the use of the word is admissible at all, it 

 ought to be banished from the vocabulary of morals." 

 (Deontology, i. p. 32.) The distinction between the 

 desirable and the dutiful is a fact, however. The 

 desirable is merely the optional: the dutiful is the 

 imperative. The most characteristic element in the 

 latter can never be explained solely by the former. 

 The theories which derive the dutiful from the de- 

 sirable have, in all ages, had insuperable difficulties 

 in discovering a basis for moral obligation. The 

 upholders of utilitarianism have to this hour reached 

 no real unanimity on this central point. Bentham 

 went so far as to deny the existence of duty. " It is, 

 in fact, very idle to talk about duties ; the word it- 

 self has in it something disagreeable and repulsive." 

 (Ibid, p. 10.) The angular, sharp, erratic Schopen- 

 hauer suggests that conscience is composed of five 

 elements, fear of man, superstition, prejudice, van- 

 ity, and custom. (Grund Probleme der Eihik, p. 

 196.) Even David Hume, however, could say that 

 " those who have denied the reality of moral distinc- 



