150 HEREDITY. 



by the native structure of the mind, or merely be- 

 cause we perceive them to be universally true of 

 observed phenomena, I will not positively decide ; 

 but they are laws of our thoughts, now and invin- 

 cibly so. They may or may not be capable of 

 alteration by experience." (Mn^'s Admissions. See 

 McCosn, Fundamental Truth, p. 75.) The mature 

 Stuart Mill is very shy of that ice. He knew it was 

 becoming thin. [Applause.] 



Many think Mill asserts that all our fundamental 

 beliefs are the results of our environment, and might 

 have been different had our experience been dif- 

 erent; but. this is a great misapprehension. He says 

 distinctly that the more important of them may 

 or may not be capable of alteration by experience ; 

 and that is all he ever would say. If you will read 

 the chapter in McCosh's "Defence of Fundamental 

 Truth," entitled " Mr. Mill's Admissions," you will 

 find twenty-four of these singular concessions, used 

 as cimiters to cut down the haughtiness of the old 

 and now largely outgrown associational philosophy. 



But there was one point of the ice where the water 

 came through. Mill would not weigh himself there. 

 He would not trust the weight of a feather there. 

 An unscholarly rationalistic newspaper has lately 

 called on me to prove that Mill ever said that any 

 necessary belief as, for instance, that a thing cannot 

 be and not be at the same time and in the same sense 

 may be primordial or original in human nature, 

 and not the result of mere experience. I have been 

 asked to give the page and line of Mill's writ- 



