1912 JiF^^ FISHEHISS C_ ^MISSION. 39 



tition is practically eliminated, the yearly revenue of the majority of the 

 fishermen is kept at a very low figure, and the fisherman himself becomes 

 little more than the paid servant of the trust. 



In other fish markets, such as those of the American Atlantic 

 Fisheries, a situation more favourable to the net fisherman exists, in- 

 asmuch as there have become established certain firms who receive and 

 market the fish of the individual fishermen on a fixed commission basis, 

 and consequently the fisherman retains his independence and is in a 

 position to profit directly by the fluctuations of the market, and a 

 greater incentive is thereby afforded to initiative and enterprise. The 

 existence of several firms in this commission business ensures competi- 

 tion and, consequently, a fair deal to the fishermen. Such a system, 

 apparently, once prevailed over certain portions of the great lake fish- 

 eries, but it has completely disappeared in the evolution of the fish trust. 



It is clear that the great bulk of the ordinary net fishermen could 

 individually never succeed in storing, shipping and marketing their 

 catch to advantage, for even were funds available, which is usually far 

 from being the case, the very nature of their occupation precludes the 

 possibility of their having sufficient leisure to attend satisfactorily to 

 such details. Consequently, the presence of some form of middlemen 

 who will receive, store and market the fish, either by direct purchase or 

 on commission, would appear indispensable in connection with this 

 business. That under normal conditions the competitive form of middle- 

 man, as represented by the commission houses of New York, is more 

 equitable than the autocratic form, as represented by what might be 

 termed the Chicago Fish Trust, both from the point of view of the fisher- 

 man and the consumer, would seem highly probable, but it is plain that 

 if the profits of such commission houses could be reduced to a minimum, 

 so as to but little more than cover the cost of operation, the profit to 

 both fisherman and consumer would be correspondingly greater. This 

 could be achieved only by the Government undertaking the work of the 

 commission houses, or in other words, by the establishment of a Gov- 

 ernment Fish Agency. A strong plea in favour of such a measure is to 

 be found in the report of the Georgian Bay Fisheries Commission, and, 

 as no more clear or concise explanation of its advantages could very 

 well be constructed, it is quoted at length : — 



"A fish agency, or several such agencies, would be a much simpler 

 matter (i.e. than the successful Dominion Government sea-fish dryer 

 at Souris, P.E.I. ). The agent would merely act as receiver of the fish, 

 as consignee from the fishermen, and pay them at current rates on the 

 plan adopted at Souris, or at the government fish reduction works at 

 various Atlantic points; he would place them in the Government 

 refrigerator, unless the market required the fish at once, and would 

 thus fill the orders as they reached him from the various markets in 

 Canada and the United States. The fish agency would act as middleman 

 between the fisherman and the market buyers, and would leave out of 



4 F.C. 



