40 REPORT OF ONTARIO GAME No. 52 



consideration the large monopolies, who seem to crush out. all smaller 

 enterprises and fair competition. These unscrupulous combines, who 

 try, and with some success, owing to the lethargy of the public and its 

 indifference to its best interests, to monopolize the whole fish business 

 on both sides of the line; keep the fishermen in their clutches; dictate 

 the price of fish in the wholesale and retail markets, and, from a 

 Canadian point of view, work ruin to the fishing population and the 

 fishing industries. 



At least five advantages would follow from a fish agency scheme : — 



(1) The control of the United States combines and monopolies 



would cease. 



(2) The fisherman would have a central point to which he could 



with confidence send his catch of fish. 



(3) The fisherman could rely on receiving full value for his fish, 



based on the current market prices. 



(4) No w^aste of fish would occur, as the surplus of such fish as 



were not at the time in demand would be stored in the 

 refrigerator until the demand came at a later date. 



(5) The Canadian demand for fish would be met, and the large 



surplus would reach the United States markets. The present 

 high price would allow of the payment of the duty imposed 

 by the United States. Pickerel, it may be stated, have 

 recently brought the surprising price in Chicago of forty 

 cents per pound. Of course, the Canadian demand for our 

 own fish would first be met before any foreign buyers were 

 supplied." 



It will be seen from the above extract what a powerful means 

 would be afforded by such an agency, both for developing an adequate 

 fish market in Ontario and for regaining commercial control of the 

 fisheries by breaking the power of the fish trust, for not only would 

 Ontario demands naturally be met before those of outside or foreign 

 markets, but that demand could at the same time be carefully fostered 

 and cultivated, and also, with sufficient storage appliances at its dis- 

 posal, the Government would be entirely independent of the trust for 

 securing its markets, and thus the domination and dictation of the trust 

 would at one blow be annihilated. Moreover, from the existence in other 

 markets of several prosperous commission houses in this line of business, 

 it is obvious that, within reasonable bounds, the enterprise could not 

 but be as profitable as it was deemed advisable to make it. 



The effect of such a scheme in conjunction with that of partial pro- 

 hibition of export is ably recited by the Georgian Bay Fisheries Com- 



