20 Pliilosophy of the Human Mind. 



vibrations, which forms so prominent a feature of 

 his work, should be deemed favourable to materi- 

 alism. " He was therefore anxious to declare, 

 and to have it understood, that he was no materi- 

 alist."" Notwithstanding this declaration, how- 

 ever, it is difficult to reconcile his doctrines with 

 the immateriality of the soul. Good judges have 

 pronounced that if these doctrines be pursued to 

 their natural consequences, they must terminate 

 in absolute Spinozism. Accordingly it is well 

 known, that some of the most distinguished ma- 

 terialists of the age not only profess to admire Dr. 

 Hartley's work, but also adopt his reasonings, 

 and acknowledge him as their great master. 



Another metaphysical system, which deserves to, 

 be mentioned among the curiosities of the age, is 

 that adopted and published by Lord Monboddo, a 

 celebrated and voluminous writer of North-Britain. 

 This system is, in fact, little more than a revival of 

 what his Lordship considers the Aristotelian philo- 

 sophy, or the doctrine of Universale, with the ad- 

 dition of some crude and absurd visions of his own, 

 which have been little studied, and still less respect- 

 ed by those who are competent to judge. 



n The following passage is extracted from the Life of Dr. Hartlet, 

 published with the last edicion of his work. 



" There was but one point in which he appeared anxious to prevent any 

 misapprehension of his principles : that point respected the immateriality 

 of the soul. He was apprehensive lest the doctrine of corporeal vibrations, 

 being instrumental to sensation, should be deemed unfavourable to the 

 opinion of the immateriality of the soul. He was therefore anxious to de- 

 clare, and to have it understood, that he was not a materialist. He has 

 not presumed to declare any sentiment respecting the nature of the soul, 

 but the negative one, that it cannot be material according to any idea or 

 definition that we can form of matter. He has given the following defini- 

 tion of matter, viz. * That it is a mere passive thing, of whose very es- 

 sence it is to be endued with a vis inertia ; for this vis inertia presents itself 

 immediately in all our observations and experiments upon it, and is inse- 

 parable from it, even in idea.' The materiality therefore of the sensitive 

 soul is precluded, by the definition of matter being incapable of sensation. 

 If there be any other element capable of sensation, the soul may consist of 

 that element ; but that is a new supposition, still leaving the original ques- 

 tion concluded in the negative, by the fundamental definition of matter," 



