Philosophy of the Human Mind. 23 



" Still, however, when inquiry is made, among 

 the followers of this singular man, respecting the 

 general drift of his system, they answer chiefly in 

 negations. It ib not atheism ; for he affirms that 

 practical reason is entitled to infer the existence of 

 a Supreme Intelligence. It is not theism ; for he 

 denies that theoretical reason can demonstrate the 

 existence of an infinite intelligent Being. It is not 

 materialism; for he maintains that time and space 

 are only forms of our perception, and not the at- 

 tributes of extrinsic existences. It is not idealism ; 

 for he maintains that noumena are independent of 

 phenomena; that things perceptible are prior to 

 perception. It is not libertinism; for he allows 

 the will to be determined by regular laws. It is 

 not fatalism; for he defines this to be a system in 

 ch the' connection of purposes in the world is 

 considered as accidental. It is not dogmatism; 

 for he favours every possible doubt. It is not 

 scepticism; for he affects to demonstrate what he 

 teaches. Such are the indefinite evasions of this 

 school." 7 The disciples of this celebrated pro- 

 fessor assure us that their system is so profound and 

 extensive, that the acutest understanding cannot 

 tolerably comprehend it by less than a twelve- 

 month's study; and that to become a thorough 

 master of its subtle and recondite principles, re- 

 quires the unwearied labour of many years. After 

 such a declaration, it would be presumptuous for 

 one but slightly acquainted with the subject to 

 attempt an exhibition even of the outlines of this 

 plan. But not to omit all notice of so celebrated a 

 system, it may be proper to state the following 

 doctrines, as among the elementary principle* 

 which it contains. 



f Monthly Jtojro of Londos, vol. xxviii. N. S. p. 61. 1707* 



