444 Additional Notes. 



the university he studied physic, and engaged for a time in 

 the practice of this profession. In 1664 he went to Germany, 

 as secretary to Sir William Swan, English envoy to the 

 Elector of Brandenburgh. In 1 670 he began to form the 

 plan of his Essay on the Human Understanding, which he 

 published in 1690. He died in 1704. Of the vigorous in- 

 tellect, the profound and extensive views, the great learning, 

 and the excellent character of this celebrated " master builder" 

 in science, it is unnecessary to speak. The above dates are 

 given merely for the convenience of reference. 



Ei^rors and Tendency of Locke's Philosophy, p. 6. 



While ample justice is done to Mr. Locke's genius; while 

 the splendid service which he rendered to the philosophy of 

 mind is readily acknowledged; and while his intentions are 

 allowed to have been unexceptionably pure ; yet it may be 

 doubted, whether his writings have not done more to pro- 

 mote a spirit of scepticism than those of any other individual 

 since his time. This effect has been produced, not only by 

 some of his doctrines, but also by the general spirit of his 

 philosophy. 



In tracing all our ideas to two sources, sensation and re-> 

 flection, he imposed on the mind of the inquirer by a plau- 

 sible, but most deceitful appearance of simplicity. It is no 

 less true in the philosophy of the mind than in that of the 

 physical sciences, that attempts to simplify and generalize may 

 be carried not only further than truth will warrant, but also 

 to a seductive and mischievous length. Mr. Locke defines 

 reflection to be " the notice which the mind takes of its own 

 operations, and the manner of them." This definition, be- 

 sides being rather descriptive of consciousness than of rejlec- 

 tion, embraces a more important error. - To say that all our 

 ideas are ideas either of sensation or reflection, is to say that 

 we can think of nothing but an object of sense, or an act of 

 our own minds. But is this true? According to this ac- 

 count, what shall we say to the various exercises of memory, 

 of imagination, Sec. ? This philosopher, also, in represent- 

 ing ideas, not as thoughts in the mind, nor yet the external 

 objects of thought; but as intermediate, occult images, 

 which alone the mind contemplates, gave countenance to a 

 principle from which the most dangerous and absurd inferences 

 have since been made. The whole controversy about innate 





