Additional Notes. 463 



Stated, is a material substance, and must, of course, be sub- 

 ject to the laws of matter. But is matter, while it retains its 

 nature, susceptible of these radical and essential changes ? Its 

 form may be changed; the relation of its particles may varv; 

 but its essential properties must remain the same. Notwith- 

 standing this, the sentient principle, according to Dr. Dar- 

 win, is continually undergoing changes of the most radical 

 kind. The spirit of animation in volition differs from the 

 spirit of animation in sensation, not merely in the position of 

 its particles, but in its nature. We are elevated with rapture, 

 or writhe in agony ; we revolt with horror from an object, or 

 hasten to meet it with joy; we are alternately actuated by 

 hope and fear, desire and aversion, love and hatred, joy and 

 sorrow; in short, there is a diversity almost endless in the 

 modes of our feelings, and in the characters of our ideas. 

 Can ail these different and opposite states of mind be accounted 

 for by any supposable changes in one homogeneous fluid? 

 Or is it possible for that fluid to retain its nature, and all its 

 defined attributes, and yet to be continually undergoing this 

 essential change? Assuredly this cannot be the case, con- 

 sistenly with any physical laws with which we are ac- 

 quainted. 



Again ; in defining the difference between irritation, sensa- 

 tion, volition, and association, Dr. Darwin resolves it all 

 into the different portion of the sensorium in which they ori- 

 ginate. Thus, " irritation is an exertion or change of some 

 extreme parts of the sensorium ; sensation is an exertion or 

 change of the central parts;" &c. But the Sensorial Power 

 resides in every part of the body, and it is every where the 

 same fluid, secreted by the same gland, endued with the same 

 attributes, and susceptible of the same changes; and, of 

 course, mere difference of place, if other circumstances be 

 equal, is not sufficient to account for so great a difference as 

 that between irritation and volition; and so of the rest. This 

 is assigning a cause which is not known to exist ; and which, 

 if it do exist, is not sufficient to explain the phenomena. 



But further defects in this theory appear. — From what or- 

 gan of sense do we derive our abstract ideas? What fibrous 

 motions are excited when we call to mind the ideas of wis- 

 dom, benevolence, justice and truth ? According to Dr. 

 Darwin, these general ideas are repetitions of former parti- 

 cular perceptions, obtained through the organs of sense. But 

 can general ideas be mere repetitions of particular ones? 

 The simple statement of the doctrine is sufficient for its refuta- 



