Chap. XII.] Philosophij of the Human iM'tml iGf) 



But while ample justice is done to Mr. Locke's 

 genius; while the splendid service wliich he ren- 

 dered to the philosophy of mind is readily acknow- 

 ledged ; and while his intentions are allowed to 

 have been nnexceptionably pure ; yet it may be 

 doubted whether his writings have not done more 

 to promote a spirit of scepticism than those oi'imy 

 other individual since his time, 'i his eficct has 

 l)een produced not only by some oi' his doctrines, 

 but also by the general spirit of his philosophy. 



In tracino* all our ideas to two sources, sensation 

 and refttction, he imposed on the mind of the in- 

 quirer by a plausible/but very deceitful, appear- 

 ance of simplicit}^ It is no less true in the philo- 

 sophy of the mind than in that of the physical 

 sciences^ that attempts to simplify and generalise 

 may be carried not only further than truth will 

 •warrant, but also to a seductive and mischievous 

 length. Mr. Locke defmes njkciion to be *' the 

 notice which the mind takes of its own o[)erations, 

 and the manner of them.'' This definition, be- 

 side being rather descriptive oF consciousness than 

 of reflection, embraces a more important errour. 

 To say that all our ideas are ideas either of sensa- 

 tion cr reflection, is to say that we can think of 

 nothing but an object of sense, or an act of (mr 

 own minds. But is this true ? According to this 

 account, what shall we say to the various exercise^ 

 of memory, of imagination, &c. ? This I)hi^)^()- 

 pher, also, in representing ideas not as thoughts in 

 the mind, nor yet the external objects of tliought, 

 but as intermediate, occult iniacres, whicli alone 

 the mind contemplates, gave countenance to a 

 principle from which the most dangcious and ah- 



