170 Philosophy of the Human Mind [Chap. XII* 



surd inferences have since been made. The whole 

 controversy about innate ideas, if IMr. Locke uni- 

 formly employ tliis phrase in the same sense, is a 

 var of v;ords. If an idea be an object of thought 

 which intervenes between the mind and the thing 

 perceived, none can, or ever did, suppose that ideas 

 AxQ innate in this sense. To assert that the mind 

 has such innate ideas, would be to represent it as 

 thinkirg before it thinks, and acting before it 

 acts. — From these, and other erroneous principles 

 taught by this great philosopher, it soon became 

 apparent that doctrines from which he wo«!ld have 

 shrunk with abhorrence must necessarily result; 

 and the history of metaphysical science since his 

 time evinces how mischievous errour is, when sup- 

 ported by the authority of such a mind as that 

 whicli produced the Es><aij on the Human Under- 

 standing. 



From tlie date of this great man's work^ the old 

 Ontology and Logic liave declined. The philoso- 

 phy of mind has assumed a more simple, popular, 

 and intelligible aspect. And although it has been 

 since made to appear probable that some of the 

 doctrines v.liich he taught ai-e erroneous, yet that > 

 lie contributed nioi'c than any other individual of 

 modern tinics to develope the nature and operations 

 of the human mind, ai^d to introduce a more ra- 

 tional ar.d correct mode of pliilosophising on this 

 subject than had btjfore prevailed, seems to be ge- 

 ueialiy admitted. 



Not long before Mr. Tocke published his cele- 

 brated Essay, father Malebranche, a learned and 

 acute metaphysician of France, in a work entitled 

 Recherche de La I'eri'c, or Injuiry after Truths pub- 



