172 Fhilosophij of tJiC Human Mincl [Chap. XII. 



ous uovk, designed to explain, support, and ex- 

 tend it. He went beyond tlie Frencli philosopher, 

 on the subject of the material world ; for although 

 he maintained the prohahilitij of its existence, he 

 denied our having any evidence absolute^^ deci- 

 sive that this is the fact. 



In 1710 a doctrine still more singular and dar- 

 ing was announced by George Berkeley^ a philo- 

 sopher of Ireland, and afterward bishop of Cloyne. 

 This gentleman, equally distinguished for the pe- 

 netration and comprehensiveness of his mind^ the 

 extent of his learning, and the eminence of his 

 virtues, denied the existence of a material world ; 

 contending that what are usually called sensible 

 objects without us, are only ideas in the mind ; 

 that there is nothing in the universe but spirits^ 

 and ideas, or images subsisting in and perceived 

 by them, lie differed from Mx, Locke in several 

 other respects beside this. lie discarded reflec- 

 tion as a source of ideas ; he divided the objects of 

 human knowledp;e into tv/o kinds, ideas and nO" 

 tions. The first, according to him, are presented 

 to us i)y our five senses; they have no existence 

 when tlicy are not perceived, and exist only in the 

 minds of those who perceive them. The second 

 kind of objects he supposed to comprehend spirits, 

 their acts, and the relations and habitudes of 

 things : of these, he contended, we have iwtions 

 but not ideas. J^ut of all the opinions taught by 

 this great and good man, none have rendered him 

 more famous tlian his denial that those prototypes 

 of our ideas, usually called material objects, have 

 any real existence; and contending that all the 

 \ aried beauties of creation Mhich we behold are 



