1 76 Philosophif of the Human Mind, [Ckap. XII. 



no idea of power ; no otlier idea of a cause, but that 

 it is something antecedent, and constantly con- 

 joined to that which we call its effects; in a word, 

 that we can liave no idea of any thing but our sen- 

 sations, and the operations of mind of which we 

 arc conscious," and that nothing else exists *. 



But though Mi\ Hume's fiindamental doctrines 

 were thus extrava^'ant and absurd ; and thouo:h 

 his philosophy, falsely so called, leads to the most 

 unlinnted scepticism, as he doubtless intended it 

 should ; yet both he and bishop Berkeley rendered 

 important service to metaphysical science. The 

 mode in which they discussed their very errours and 

 absurdities contributed to confer on this branch of 

 philosophy a perspicuity and precision, which are 

 of the utmost importance in studying the human 

 mind. 



On the subject of causotion Mr. Hume has 

 thrown new light. Some of his reasonings, indeed^ 

 on this subject, were suggested by Malebranche, 

 and, even at a still earlier period, by Bacon and 

 Hobbes. Ideas, also, similar to sonre of those 

 which he advanced, Avere thrown out by Barrow^ 

 Butler, ]]erkeley, and others. But Mr. Hume has 

 the merit ot" having first clearly shown to philoso- 

 phers that our common language, with respect to 

 cause and effect, is merely analogical ; and that, 

 il' there be any links among physical events, they 

 must for ever remain invisible to us. Nor is the 

 justness of this doctrine to be doubted on account 

 (Tf the sceptical inferences which its author has de- 

 duced from it : his errour, in this case^ does not so 



^' Heid's Essai/s, ii. 



