Chap. XIL] Philosophj of the Human Mind. 1 77 



much lie in his premises as in the conchisions 

 which he draws from them. In tact, if this part 

 of his system be admitted ; and if, at the same 

 time, we admit the authority of that principle of 

 the mind whicli leads- us to refer every event to an 

 efficient cause ; his doctrine conducts us to a re- 

 sult more subhme, more favourable to piety, and 

 more consistent with sound philosophy, than the 

 opinion commonly held on this subject*. 



On observing the sceptical conclusions which 

 Berkeley and Hume had drawn from the old 

 theory of perception, as it had been taught in sub- 

 stance by all writers, from Pythagoras down to 

 their time, some philosophers of Great Britain 

 were led, about the middle of the eighteenth ccn- 

 tur}v to call this theory in question. If it were 

 assumed as true that we perceive, not external ob- 

 jects themselves, but only the ideas in our minds, 

 they saw no method of avoiding the consequences 

 which had been so daringly admitted. They, 

 therefore, denied the grand doctrine on whicli 

 the whole superstructure they wished to oppose 

 was built ; and endeavoured to show, that as the 

 premises were gratuitously assumed and false, so 

 the conclusions deduced from them were absurd 

 and impossible. This controversy, doubtless, de- 

 serves to be considered amono- the most memora- 

 ble of the age; and if the principles and reason- 

 ings of certain modern metaphysicians of North 

 Britain, to the publication of which this contro- 

 versy has given rise, be regarded as just, they cer- 

 tainly form the most important accession which 



* Stewart's Philosophj/ of Mind, Notes C. and D. 



Vol. II. N 



