Chap. XII.] Philosophij of the Thunan Mind. 179 

 other reason for these /acts takino- place, but that 

 such IS the constitution of our nature; and that 

 when sensible objects are presented to us, we be- 

 come persuaded that they exist, and tluit they pos- 

 sess the qualities which we witness, not by a train 

 of reasoning, by formal reflection, or by associa- 

 tion of ideas ; but by a direct and necessary con- 

 nection between the presence of such objects and 

 our consequent perceptions. In short, the great 

 and distinguishing peculiarity of tliis class of me- 

 taphysicians is, that they appeal from tlic delusive 

 principles and shocking conclusions of their op- 

 ponents, to the Common Sense of mankind, as a 

 tribunal paramount to all the subtleties of philoso- 

 ])hy. The same principle they apply to memory, 

 and other powers of the mind. 



It is obvious, from this view of Dr. Reid's la- 

 bours, that, although he has taken much pains to 

 overturn the old theory of perception, lie has not 

 ventured to substitute any theory of his own in its 

 place. Indeed it would have been inconsistent 

 with his leading doctrine to have attempted this. 

 His aim rather was to give a simple and precise 

 statement of facts, divested of all theoretical ex- 

 pressions ; to show how long philosophers have im- 

 posed on themselves by principles gratuitously 

 assumed, and by words without meauing; and to 

 convince them that, '' with respect to the process 

 of nature in perception, they are no less ignorant 

 than the vulgar." Nor let any slight this as a 

 niiere negative and unimportant discovery. If it 

 be founded in truth, '' icw^ positive discoveries in 

 the whole history of science can be mentioned, 

 which have a juster claim to liigli reputation t)iai\ 



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