180 Philasopht/ of the Human Mind. [Chap. XII. 



that which has detected, so clearly and unanswera- 

 bly, the fallacy of an hypothesis, which has de- 

 scended to us from the earliest ages of philosophy, 

 and which, in modern times, has not only seiTed 

 to Berkeley and Hume as the basis of their scepti- 

 cal systems, but was adopted as an indisputable 

 truth by Locke, by Clarke, and by Newton *." 



Beside the doctrine of perception, stated in the 

 above-mentioned page, Dr. Reid's system is distin- 

 guished by a view of the powers of the mind, or of 

 the sources of our ideas, Avhich differs considerably 

 from the systems of his predecessors. Instead of 

 dividing the intellectual powers into simple appre^ 

 hension, judgment, and reasonings as the greater 

 number of metaphysical writers have done since 

 the days of Aristotle, he considers this division as 

 far from embracing all the phenomena of mind. 

 He does not, indeed, attempt a complete enumera- 

 tion of all the powers of the human understand- 

 ing ; but supposes that there are at least 7iine ; viz, 

 1. The powers we have by means of our external 

 senses. 2. IMemory. 3. Conception. 4. The powers 

 of resolving and analysing complex objects, and 



* Elements of the Vhilosophy of Mind, by Dugald Stewart, 

 F.R.S.E. &-C., p. 94, 4to, 1792. In adopting, from professor 

 Stewart, this high praise of Dr. Reid, and his writings on the 

 human mind, I would by no means be understood to express un- 

 qualified approbation of his philosophy. To rae his Essays on the 

 Active Puivers of Man have always appeared much inferior to those 

 on the Intellectual Pouers. Indeed in the former tliere are several 

 doctrines which I must consider as entirely erroneous. But of 

 tlms guarding and qualifying our approbation there is no end. 

 Speaking of Dr. Reid's works in general, they are certainly among 

 tlie most instructive and valuable metaphysical writings of the 

 age. 



