1 92 Philosophi/ of the Human Mind. [Chap. XII. 



ley, to correspond with some vibratory state of 

 the medullary substance, so that the one may be 

 regarded as the exponent of the other ^. 



Though this system contains many ideas which 

 bear a near relation to the theories of des Cartes, 

 Malebranche, and Leibnitz f ; and though its two 

 fundamental principles are derived from the works 

 of Newton and Locke, yet the author has a con- 

 siderable claim to the character of originality. 

 His doctrines, combined as they are, and formed 

 into a fair structure, belong to himself, and cer- 

 tainly present some new and useful truths. It seems 

 to be the opinion of many that he ought to be 

 classed with the ?natcna lists of the age, and it is 

 not easy to assign him any other place. This, in- 

 deed, is contrary to his own express declarations. 

 He was apprehensive lest the doctrine of corporeal 

 vibrations, which forms so prominent a feature of 

 his work, should be deemed favourable to materi- 

 alism. '^ He was therefore anxious to declare, 

 and to have it miderstood, that he was no materi- 

 alist J.*' Notwithstanding this declaration, how- 



* Observations on Man, vol. i. See also Belsham's Elements of 

 the Philosophy of Mind, kc, Svo, 1801. 



t Observations on Man, vol. i p. 1 10, and 111, Edit. Lond. 

 1/91. 



X The following passage is extracted from the Life of Dr. 

 Hartley, published with the last edition of his work. 



" There was but one point in which he appeared anxious to 

 prevent any misapprehension of his principles: that point re- 

 spected the immateriality of the soul. He was apprehensive lest 

 the doctrine of corporeal vibrations being instrumental to sensa- 

 tion should be deemed unfavourable to the opinion of the imma- 

 teriality of the soul. He was therefore anxious to declare, and to 

 have it understood, that he was not a materialist. He has not 

 presumed to declare any sentiment respecting tlie nature of the 



