198 Philosophyof the Human Mind. [Cha?. XIJ. 



no more is meant than that they are perceived in 

 space, or in the form of external organisation. He 

 believes, that as the nature and form of our per- 

 ceptions are determined by the nature of our sen- 

 sible faculty, so the form of our thoughts, or the 

 manner in \vhich we judge concerning phenomena, 

 or arrange our perceptions, is determined by the 

 nature of our theoretical reason ; and as that which, 

 when knowledge is obtained by means of the 

 senses, gives a form to the matter perceived, is 

 called a pure perception; so that by which we de- 

 termine the connection of our observations^ and 

 form a judgment concerning them, is called a. pure 

 votion, ov category. Those pure notions which are 

 discoverable by an analysis of the judgment, may 

 be reduced to notions of quantity, quahty, rela- 

 tion, and modification. These categories, consi- 

 dered abstractedly, are not deduced from our per- 

 ceptions and experience, but exist in the mind 

 prior to these latter, and experience is the result of 

 their combination with our perceptions : but it is 

 only in connection \vith our perceptions that these 

 pure notions can be the source of knowledge ; for, 

 in themselves, they are mere forms, without any 

 independent existence. They serve to direct us in 

 the use of our observations ; but they cannot ex- 

 tend our knowledge beyond the limits of percep- 

 tion and experience. 



*' There are, according to professor Kant, two 

 kinds of propositions, concerning which our minds 

 may be employed, analytical and synthetical. 

 The former are those in which we only explain or 

 illustrate that of which we have already some idea; 

 "W'hereas^ in the latter^ ^vc incrtase our knowledge, 



