Difficulties and Methods 19 



first shows a certain feeling corresponding to these secret 

 states of the organism (a feeling of 'predilection' for such 

 a career, etc.), how can we dare to deny to the second 

 analogous states of consciousness?" (122). If it is argued 

 that we have no direct, but only an inferential, knowl- 

 edge of the processes in an animal's mind, the argument 

 is equally valid against human psychology, for the psychol- 

 ogist has only an inferential knowledge of his neighbor's 

 mind (124). 



Wasmann defends the animal mind from a different 

 position. For one thing, he believes that mental processes 

 may act causally upon bodily states. He accepts, in other 

 words, what is called n^mc_tionism, as opposed to parallel- 

 ism. Further, although he strongly opposes the doctrine 

 that the reactions of animals are unconscious tropisms and 

 constantly emphasizes their variability and modifiability 

 through experience, he nevertheless believes that a gulf 

 separates the human from the animal mind. The term 

 " intelligence " which most writers use to designate merely 

 the power of learning by individual experience, Wasmann 

 would reserve for the power of deducing and understand- 

 ing relations, and would assign only to human beings 

 (761, 762). Although animals have their instincts modified 

 by sense experience, man " stands through his reason and 

 freedom immeasurably high above the irrational animal 

 that follows, and must follow, its sensuous impulse without 

 deliberation" (763). 



For el, in the third place, is what is called a monist in 

 metaphysics. That is, he does not believe either that mind 

 and body are parallel, or that they interact causally, but 

 that they are two aspects of the same reality. " Every psy- 

 chic phenomenon is the same real thing as the molecular 

 or neurocymic activity of the brain-cortex coinciding with 



