The History of Things 85 



denominator, but its interpretations are always in 

 terms of conceptual formulae — such as matter, 

 energy, ether, gravitation, chemical affinity, and 

 so on — which are not themselves self-explanatory; 

 which are in fact only intellectual counters, sym- 

 bols of the mysterious reality. 



Again, science continually tries to refund one 

 natural phenomenon into another, seeking to 

 show that given certain conditions A, B, C, cer- 

 tain results D, E, F will always follow. When 

 D, E, F are simply A, B, C in a new guise, as 

 when we get a single resultant force out of sev- 

 eral components, the scientific interpretation is 

 complete. When D, E, F are quite different 

 from A, B, C, as when we get water by combining 

 hydrogen and oxygen, we know that the conditions 

 have somehow passed over into the resultants, but 

 we cannot tell how the result is as it is. This is 

 true of most scientific interpretations. They do 

 not deal with causes in the sense in which we speak 

 of a personal agency as a cause. 



Again, science in its historical treatment of 

 things always starts from something *' given," 

 which it does not explain, which in the last re- 

 source it cannot explain. From this something 

 "given" there seems to be a continuous develop- 

 ment, and it is therefore believed that this ante- 

 cedent had in it the potentiality of all that comes 

 out of it. Thus, if order, progress, harmony, 



