208 The Bible of Nature 



as things are, rooks obey the convention by a ne- 

 cessity of a somewhat lower order than that which 

 moves the virtuous man, who is moved by a 

 thought of racial and social consequences, or by 

 a conception of what is fit for conduct universal. 

 In man's case, moreover, the matter is compli- 

 cated theoretically — though simplified practically 

 — by the high development of what might be 

 called the external conscience, embodied in social 

 traditions, institutions, and laws. In short, just 

 as we find in animals perceptual inferences but not 

 conceptual inferences, so we find no feelings born 

 of general ideas. Animals may be kind, gentle, 

 devoted, and rich in good feelings, but they have 

 no moral feelings or conscience. 



At the same time, one cannot doubt that ani- 

 mals have the power of controlling present con- 

 duct in reference to an end more or less distant. 

 Apart from the habitual inhibitory powers of 

 trained animals, there are many such cases; thus 

 it is difficult to believe that beavers, who cut a 

 canal across an island or across the bend of a river, 

 have not a perception of the end to be gained. 

 The labor hardly justifies itself until the work is 

 done. But at the most this is a concrete ideal. 

 It would be an error, however, to exaggerate this 

 distinction as if it were quite absolute. It seems 

 more likely that intelligence and reason, the powers 

 of perception and conception, will merge, for just as 



