The 'What' and the ' Hozu' of Mind 273 



each general feature of the 'what' in nature lias arisen 

 upon just such an interpretation of the saUent aspects 

 presented in the career of individual things. But this 

 would be to write a large and most difficult chapter of 

 genetic philosophy. 



Our second point in regard to the ' what,' therefore, is 

 that any * what ' whatever is in large measure made up of 

 judgjueiits based tipon experiences of the ' Jlozv' The 

 fundamental concepts of philosophy reflect the catego- 

 ries of origin, both in their application to individuals — to 

 the 'mere thing' — and also in the interpretation which 

 they have a right to claim ; for they are our mental ways 

 of dealins: with what is ' mere ' on one hand and of the 

 final reading of reality which philosophy makes its method. 

 Of course the question may be asked : how far, origin } — 

 that is, how far back in the career of the thing is it nec- 

 essary to go to call the halting-place ' origin ' .? This we 

 may well return to lower down ; the point here is that 

 origin is always a reading of part of the very career which 

 is the content of the concept of the nature of the thing. 



§ 3. The 'What' and the ' Hozv' of Mind 



Coming now closer to particular instances of the 'what,' 

 and selecting the most refractory case that there is in the 

 world, let us ask these questions concerning the mind. 

 I select this case because, in the first place, it is the case 

 urgently pressing upon us ; and, second, because it is the 

 case in which there seems to be, if anywhere, a gaping dis- 

 tinction between the 'what' and the 'how.' Modern evo- 

 lution claims to discuss the 'how' only, not to concern 

 itself with the ' what ' ; or, again, it claims to solve the 



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