Dcfiiiilioii of ^ Origin 291 



freedom in its meaning in reality, i.e., with its prospeetive 

 outlook, is prophetic of novelties — is not adequately con- 

 strued in terms of history. So both can be held to be 

 valid, but only by denying universality to both 'intuitions,' 

 and confining each to its sphere and peculiar reference in 

 the make-up of reality. 



§ 10. Definition of ^Origin' 



Another thing to be referred to in this rough discussion 

 concerns the more precise definition of 'origin.' How 

 much of a thing's career belongs to its origin } How far 

 back must we go to come to origin } 



Up to this point I have used the word with a meaning 

 which is very wide. Without trying to find a division of a 

 thing's behaviour into the present of it as distinguished 

 from its history, I have rather distinguished the two atti- 

 tudes of mind engendered by the contemplation of a thing, 

 i.e.y the ' retrospective ' attitude and the ' prospective ' atti- 

 tude. When we come to ask for any real division between 

 origin and present existence we have to ask what a thing's 

 present value is. In answer to that we must say that its 

 present value resides very largely in what we expect it to 

 do ; and then it occurs to us that what we expect it to do is 

 no more or less than what it has before done. So our idea 

 of what is, as was said above, gets its content from what 

 has been — which is to inquire into its history, or to ask for 

 a fuller or less full statement of its origin or career. So 

 the question before us seems to resolve itself into the task 

 of finding somewhere in a thing's history a line which di- 

 vides its career up to the present into two parts : one 

 properly described as origin, and the other not. Now, on 

 the view of the naturalist pure and simple, there can be no 



