THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 113 



her at once from her position of vantage at Greytown was a 

 sine qua non of peace. 



Mr. Clayton, blinded perhaps to the importance of the first 

 object by his extreme eagerness to accomplish the second, en- 

 tered upon the negotiation without feeling quite justified in 

 placing before England as an ultimatum the complete relin- 

 quishment of her claims over Mosquitia. He was prepared 

 to yield community of interests and joint control in the canal, 

 but feared to present this as the ultimate and only quid pro 

 quo for total abandonment of British territorial claims in Cen- 

 tral America. British statesmen were fully advised that ex- 

 clusive English control of the canal would not be tolerated 

 by the United States. A share in its management at best 

 was as much as England could reasonably expect, and as a 

 means of securing that share she already held Greytown, in 

 the name of the Mosquito king. 



In the correspondence that took place between the Secre- 

 tary of State, Mr. Clayton, and Messrs. Bancroft and Law- 

 rence, successive American Ministers in London, and also in 

 the records of interviews between Mr. Clayton and Mr. Cramp- 

 ton, the British Minister in Washington, preparatory to the 

 actual negotiations for a treaty, the attitude of Mr. Clayton 

 -and of the Taylor administration toward the question of a 

 Central American canal is fully and most clearly set forth. 

 The Secretary of State was thoroughly in accord with the 

 popular view that under no circumstances should the United 

 States permit Great Britain or any other power to exercise 

 exclusive control of any isthmian transit route. Upon the 

 other hand, he did not seek for his own country the exclusive 

 control he denied to others, and in assuming his position he 

 followed the universally accepted theory of the complete 

 neutrality of ship canals. The doctrine of international free- 

 dom of transit as applying to artificial waterways had been 

 defended by Mr. Clay in 1826, and supported by unanimous 

 resolutions of Congress in 1835 and again in 1839. President 

 Polk had not found this doctrine inconsistent with his notions 

 of an aggressive Monroe Doctrine, and his successor, in his 

 annual message to Congress of 1849, had declared that " no 



