THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 199 



tutes herself the sole guardian of the open route from the 

 Atlantic to the Pacific, she takes upon herself a grave respon- 

 sibility, a responsibility which may prove exceedingly bur- 

 densome. The almost inevitable conclusion presents itself 

 that the first European war would thus convert the United 

 States from a neutral power into an unwilling participant. 

 This should be reckoned a large price to pay for the advan- 

 tages to be gained from an " American Canal." 



The return for so great a price a price that means no 

 less than a departure from a cherished and time-honored 

 policy should indeed be great. It should be a national 

 advantage, so great and valuable that it is absolutely indis- 

 pensable to her safety and welfare. 



Is the advantage, then, of fortifying the canal and closing 

 it against foreign measures of aggression worth so great a 

 sacrifice ? for only in time of war against the United States 

 would she desire to bar the route against naval vessels, and 

 then only against the ships of an enemy. Under present con- 

 ditions this might indeed be considered a doubtful advantage. 

 The value to the United States of exclusive control of this 

 route in periods of hostility will depend very largely upon 

 the relative size of her own and her adversary's navy. The 

 peculiar nature of a long narrow channel through a region 

 of tropical jungle is such as to render it extremely doubtful 

 whether a large protective force could secure its use, even 

 against an inferior foe. 



A canal with its series of locks, dams, and artificial embank- 

 ments, presents many vulnerable points to methods of modern 

 attack. A resolute enemy equipped with efficient appliances 

 might easily destroy the use of the passage for months, an act 

 which the most extraordinary vigilance could not prevent. 

 In case of war, when a superior navy might invest the place, 

 the advantages to the United States of the possession of the 

 passage might be turned into an actual disadvantage. A 

 blockade might then be effected at either terminus of the 

 route, and maintained to the great injury of the United 

 States. The imprisonment of American war vessels in the 

 canal, either by blockade or by the destruction of a dam or 



