200 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS 



lock, might easily result in the most serious calamities. In 

 fact, the fear of this very contingency, and of the loss of ves- 

 sels by explosion of mines placed in the channel, would likely 

 render its use impracticable in times of war. 



Assuming that it were possible so effectively to guard the 

 channel that its use could be preserved to the United States 

 in times of conflict, and closed against the enemy, the fact 

 yet remains that the United States is wholly unprepared to 

 maintain with safety the exclusive control over the route. 

 The protection of the American coasts depends, after all, 

 upon the strength of the navy, and all outlying posts which 

 must be guarded are of value only as they may be defended 

 without too great a division of strength. 



While the policy of the United States calls for an annual 

 increase in the navy, there are other powers whose needs will 

 require them, not only to keep pace with the general advance 

 in 'armament, but to maintain for many years to come larger 

 naval fleets than that of the United States. Such being the 

 case, American efforts to retain a position of exclusiveness 

 on the isthmus may prove, after all, to be of doubtful expedi- 

 ency. 



It may often be asserted that England's military occupa- 

 tion of Egypt and her fortifications along the route to India, 

 together with her ownership of a controlling interest in the 

 Suez Canal itself, virtually invest her with political proprie- 

 torship of that channel. But while it is true that the free- 

 dom of transit into the Red Sea has not been subjected to the 

 test of a general European war yet, there has been no act of 

 England so far that violates the terms of the Constantinople 

 agreement. She claims no extraordinary political rights over 

 the canal itself, and makes no attempt to fortify the route. 

 Her line of possessions and naval stations from Gibraltar to 

 Hong Kong, are permitted in no way to threaten the neu- 

 trality of the canal. On the contrary, England has always 

 taken the initiative steps in bringing about international agree- 

 ments to secure its neutral character. Her superior naval 

 strength undoubtedly would give her the power, in case of 

 war, to effect a blockade of the Suez Canal without entering 



