THE MONROE DOCTRINE 295 



were more than passively unfriendly ; British fortifications 

 and hostile Indians along the lakes and upper Ohio River 

 impeded expansion to the west. On the south and the 

 southwest, France and Spain overshadowed the pioneer 

 republic in extensive domain. 



Under these conditions, the earlier American statesmen 

 were tempted to profit by the rivalries of European nations, 

 and thus obtain by foreign alliances, the strength necessary 

 to carry the republic through the critical period of infancy. 

 A single venture in this direction (the treaty with France, 

 of 1778) taught the fathers a useful lesson. It was but a 

 few years later that France, finding herself involved in war 

 with Great Britain, promptly called upon the United States 

 to fulfil her treaty obligations. This the United States was 

 unable to do. To invite another war with England would 

 have been suicidal ; to remain neutral was to offend France. 

 In either case, the legitimate result of meddling in the affairs 

 of Europe seemed to be war ; and although actual war was 

 in this instance avoided, a bitter party-spirit, aroused by 

 French sympathizers, produced dissensions threatening the 

 peace of the nation. From the first, however, the wiser 

 statesmen of the period realized not merely the advisability,,) 

 but the necessity, of holding aloof from all foreign entangle-! 

 ments. This sound principle found its best expression in 

 Washington's farewell address, and long continued to be the 

 watchword of succeeding administrations, and the corner- 

 stone of the nation's foreign policy. Each President in turn 

 guarded this vital principle of non-intervention, and the 

 young nation greatly prospered in its career, paying no 

 tribute to the demands of needless war. Underlying the 

 reasons usually given for maintaining an isolated political 

 position in the world, namely, the weakness of the country, 

 and its physical inability to cope with the older European 

 nations, a subtle motive is easily traced. It was felt that the 

 system of popular government inaugurated by the United 

 States would be watched with some apprehension by the 

 crowned heads of Europe. If the experiment in constitu- 

 tional government should prove successful, its effect on 



