298 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS 



ent respects so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of 

 Spain into those of any other foreign power. . . . The wisdom of 

 Congress will at the same time determine how far it may be expe- 

 dient to provide for the event of a subversion of the Spanish 

 authorities within the territory in question, and an apprehended 

 occupancy thereof by any other foreign power. 



Two months later Congress indorsed the policy of the 

 President in a resolution declaring : 



Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain and of her 

 American provinces, and considering the influence which the des- 

 tiny of the territory adjoining the southern boundary of the 

 United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and com- 

 merce, . . . the United States, under the peculiar circumstances 

 of the existing crisis, cannot, without a serious inquietude, see any 

 part of the said territory pass into the hands of any other foreign 

 power. 



Here then was a shadow of the Monroe Doctrine cast before. 

 The " destiny " of the Republic was proving itself; it figured 

 here as a factor in determining a question of foreign policy. 

 The acquisition of East Florida (the remaining portion of 

 the old Spanish province that constitutes in part the present 

 state of that name) was made in quite the same spirit, i.e. to 

 , remove the liability of attack from contiguous territory. In 

 point of fact, Florida had long been a refuge for outlaws : 

 it was the rallying-point for many filibustering expeditions, 

 both Spanish and English, against the United States. In the 

 War of 1812 it had been used by England as a base of hostile 

 operations. The resolutions of Congress of 1811 could with 

 equal propriety be applied to the case of East Florida. 

 General Jackson was sent to clear the way for annexation 

 a task he accomplished in his own vigorous way. 



In relation to these earlier accessions of territory, the 

 spirit and purpose of the Monroe Doctrine is apparent, 

 though ill defined and crudely expressed. The nation, how- 

 ever, had not yet reached that point of development and 

 strength when even in self-defence, it could proclaim a policy 

 seemingly antagonistic to European interests. When the 

 War of 1812 had closed the United States entered upon a 



