302 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS 



that they did not contemplate using force to subjugate the 

 revolting Spanish colonies. In his annual message of 

 November 16, 1818, President Monroe said : 



From the view taken of this subject, founded on all the informa- 

 tion that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be 

 satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States 

 in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to 

 adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs. 



Only two months later, however, the President called 

 together his cabinet to discuss the subject of recognizing the 

 independence of Buenos Ayres, a measure he proposed and 

 defended vainly against the adverse counsels of his advisory 

 board. About this time Adams refers in his diary (May 29, 

 1819) to an episode that again places on record his views 

 relating to the policy of the United States toward foreign 

 interference in the affairs of the American states. The 

 Russian Minister, Mr. Poletica, had been instructed from 

 Petersburg to use all his influence with the administration to 

 keep the United States from rupturing the bonds of amity 

 that existed between them and Spain. The snapping of 

 tender ties of course related to the recognition of the South 

 American states, and Mr. Poletica went so far as to intimate 

 that unless the United States followed a policy in harmony 

 with the aims of the EuropeaVi alliance she would find her- 

 self, however unwilling, obliged in the end to "follow the 

 impulse of Europe combined." 



I related to him [Mr. Poletica] all that has been done by us 

 concerning the South American question; told him we were con- 

 vinced that Buenos Ayres at least would maintain her indepen- 

 dence of Spain ; that sooner or later they must be recognized as 

 an independent power ; that we had thought that the time would 

 before now have arrived when they might justly claim this as a 

 right, but from the time when we learnt that the allies had 

 determined, that whatever might be the event of their mediation, 

 not to use force against the South Americans, the President had 

 concluded that we might also forbear to take an immediate, 

 decisive part in their favor. 



At the opening of Congress in December, 1819, nothing 



