THE MONROE DOCTRINE 341 



This attempt to place the seal of Congressional approval 

 upon the Monroe Doctrine, and give it thereby a more 

 authoritative character, failed in less than two months after 

 its enunciation by the executive. Several reasons have been 

 assigned for this failure; one is, that Congress considered the 

 alleged threats of the allies as empty vaporings, unworthy of 

 notice ; another is, that members of Congress, believing the 

 danger to be past, were unwilling, in the absence of clear 

 evidence of hostile intentions from abroad, to lay down a 

 principle so wide and sweeping in its character, and one that 

 might possibly be regarded by friendly nations as offensive. 

 Still another reason is advanced why Mr. Clay's resolution 

 was consigned to the table. Mr. Clay was well known to 

 be a candidate for the presidency. His strength was great 

 throughout the South and the West, and his influence as 

 Speaker in the House was a powerful one. John Quincy 

 Adams also was looking in the same direction as Mr. Clay ; 

 General Jackson was a possible candidate, and the same may 

 be said of Calhoun. The " Monroe Doctrine " carried within 

 it the elements of unbounded popularity ; its champion in 

 Congress might become a political hero. The opponents of 

 Clay therefore combined against him, and he found himself 

 in the awkward attitude of fathering a measure which was 

 doomed in advance. He yielded to necessity, and consented 

 to the shelving of his resolution. 



Mr. Poinsett of South Carolina also moved a similar reso- 

 lution, which met the same fate, but political jealousy can 

 hardly be charged for the failure of Mr. Poinsett's motion. 



In his last annual message to Congress, the following year 

 (December 7, 1824), President Monroe again took occasion 

 to reaffirm the policy announced in his"*previous message. 



. . . Separated as we are from Europe /by the great Atlantic 

 Ocean, we can have no concern in the wa^s or the European Gov- 

 ernments nor in the causes which produce them. The balance 

 of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its 

 various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the 

 United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every 

 power and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But 



