THE MONROE DOCTRINE 363 



President Madison was not so thoroughly in favor of the 

 annexation of Cuba. His views, as expressed in a letter to 

 William Pinkney, in 1810, reflect the sentiment which thir- 

 teen years later crystallized into a national doctrine. " The 

 position of Cuba gives to the United States so deep an 

 interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although 

 they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spec- 

 tator at its falling under any European Government, which 

 might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce 

 and security of the United States." These views of Presi- 

 dent Madison were at that time more acceptable to the people 

 of the United States than was the idea of actual annexation. 



During the two administrations of President Monroe, great 

 anxiety was felt in Washington lest Cuba might be seized 

 by some European power. The English press, and some of 

 the more influential British statesmen, constantly insisted 

 upon the acquisition of the island, as an offset to the prepon- 

 derating influence in West Indian affairs, which the cession 

 of Florida had given to the United States. While the British 

 Government does not seem to have seriously contemplated 

 the occupation of Cuba, apprehension lest it might decide 

 upon such a course kept the administration not a little agi- 

 tated. This fear was enhanced by the fact that numbers of 

 pirates infested the Cuban coast and preyed upon England's 

 commerce. The Spanish Government was utterly unable to 

 suppress these marauders, and the threatened British demon- 

 strations against them, if actually made, would almost cer- 

 tainly lead to a seizure of the island itself. 



The French invasion of Spain, in 1822, also gave rise to 

 many alarms in the United States, in respect to the fate of 

 Cuba. It was generally believed that Spain must, sooner or 

 later, lose her hold upon the island, and that Cuba would 

 naturally fall to the share of France, or perhaps of Great 

 Britain, who was known to be furnishing the means to the 

 constitutional government of Spain to resist Ferdinand and 

 his French allies. It had always been one of John Quincy 

 Adams' fixed ideas that the acquisition of Cuba would eventu- 

 ally become a necessity to the political interests of the 



