THE MONROE DOCTRINE 375 



least, emancipation in Cuba would greatly imperil the policy 

 of the United States touching the question of human slavery. 



Mr. Soule's diplomacy did not bring about a satisfactory 

 settlement of the Black Warrior affair. The President was 

 far from being satisfied with the results of Mr. Soule's hot- 

 headed methods, and the Democrats called all the more 

 loudly upon its President for action for a swift retaliation 

 upon Spain, and for the immediate annexation of Cuba. 



The more conservative Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, was 

 driven to a new plan for the settlement of the vexatious 

 Spanish-American question, which plan he hoped would 

 bring about the desired results without a resort to arms. 

 Convinced that continuance of Soule's efforts in Madrid 

 would be unprofitable, he proposed (June, 1854) the ap- 

 pointment of an extraordinary commission, to be composed 

 of " two distinguished citizens " who should act in conjunc- 

 tion with Mr. Soule in reenforcing the demands of the United 

 States against Spain. The project creating such a commis- 

 sion, however, was abandoned, and as a substitute therefor, 

 Mr. Soule was instructed (August, 1854) to meet and con- 

 sult with Messrs. Buchanan and Mason, the American min- 

 isters in London and Paris. 



I am directed by the President to suggest to you a particular 

 -step, from which he anticipates much advantage to the negotia- 

 tions with which you are charged on the subject of Cuba. . . . 

 It seems desirable that there should be a full and free interchange 

 of views between yourself, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Mason, in order 

 to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object. 



The simplest and only very apparent means of obtaining this 

 -end is, for the three ministers to meet, as early as may be, at some 

 convenient central point (say Paris), to consult together, to com- 

 pare opinions as to what may be advisable, and to adopt measures 

 for perfect concert of action in aid of your negotiations at Madrid. 



While the President has, as I have before had occasion to state, 

 full confidence in your own intelligence and sagacity, he conceives 

 that it cannot be otherwise than agreeable to you, and to your col- 

 leagues in Great Britain and France, to have the consultation sug- 

 gested, and thus to bring your common wisdom and knowledge to 

 bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London, and 

 Paris. 



