THE MONROE DOCTRINE 377 



tiations for purchase should fail, was too radical even for 

 President Pierce. Mr. Marcy referred to it as u a robber 

 doctrine," which would bring shame upon the administration, 

 and would disgrace the nation in the eyes of the world. 

 44 We cannot afford to get it " (Cuba), he said, " by robbery 

 or by theft." 



The Ostentl Manifesto was left entirely unmentioned in 

 the President's annual report to Congress. The following 

 winter resolutions in Congress calling for the report, and all 

 the correspondence relating thereto, were suppressed, and 

 every effort was made by the administration to prevent the 

 publicity of the document. 



From 1854 to the outbreak of the Civil War, Cuba con- 

 tinued to occupy a prominent place in the foreign affairs 

 of the United States. From the close of the Rebellion down 

 to the late Spanish War, this same interest in Cuba was kept 

 alive, but in the absence of any definite threats by other 

 nations to acquire the island, there were no discussions in 

 Congress relative to the subject. After the collapse of slav-1 

 ery in the United States, the desire for Cuban annexation 

 largely disappeared, nor was it revived until very recently. 



During the past thirty -five years, several revolutions in 

 Cuba brought about relations between the United States and 

 Spain which were substantially similar to those which existed 

 prior to the breaking out of the late Spanish-American War, 

 conditions with which every one is familiar. If not 

 actually desiring annexation, the United States has, upon 

 all occasions, manifested a deep interest in Cuban indepen- 

 dence, and has sometimes with difficulty preserved a neutral 

 attitude. 



In this relation, one incident is noteworthy in its bearings 

 upon the Monroe Doctrine. The Cespides rebellion in Cuba 

 had dragged along for many years, with the customary record 

 of cruelties and barbarities which seems generally to have 

 marked Spanish-Cuban warfare. The inability of Spain to 

 suppress the rebellion induced President Grant, in his an- 

 nual message of December 7, 1875, to hint at intervention. 

 Spain had stubbornly refused to listen to mediation; and 



