THE MONROE DOCTRINE 445 



the United States. Belize and British Guiana supplemented 

 these outposts, and all of these English possessions, barring 

 the last, are nearer to the United States than is the territory 

 in dispute, indeed, a direct line from the southernmost 

 point of Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco River is about 

 1600 miles. The addition of this tract of land to existing 

 English possessions in the Western Hemisphere would have 

 been, after all, a matter of little consequence. The country 

 was a tropical jungle, where the maintenance of military 

 forces would be impossible, on account of its extremely 

 unhealthy climate ; and such military posts as England 

 would be likely to establish thereabouts would be located 

 in her existing Guiana colony. Under these circumstances, 

 the danger to the United States arising out of British occupa- 

 tion appeared to be wholly imaginary. If British acquisi- 

 tion of this disputed territory lying so far distant could be 

 justly regarded as threatening the safety of the United 

 States, by similar process of reasoning, to what deplorable 

 condition of helplessness is the American Government re- 

 duced by the cordon of English possessions, naval stations, 

 and fortified positions which have threatened it for one 

 hundred years ! 



Whatever may have been the dangers of European coloni- 

 zation in 1823, that danger had ceased to exist. English 

 liberty is as well guaranteed as American liberty. The 

 English colonist is as jealous of his rights and as determined 

 in the support of human freedom as is the American. 

 Wherever he or his descendants go, industry, trade, com- 

 merce, civilization, and religion go with them. In reality, 

 the English Government in its actual administration more 

 nearly approximates that of the United States than does the 

 Government of Venezuela. 



Finally it was asked, If British occupation of the disputed 

 territory entailed such disastrous consequences upon the 

 United States that the risk of war were better, would not 

 the nation's safety have demanded at the start a positive 

 denial of British rights in the premises, and a refusal to con- 

 .sent to the arbitration of the boundary lines? To insist 



