156 



DISCOVERY 



on the balance of activities between the various groups 

 of soil micro-organisms, and there is reason to believe 

 that this balance is a fundamental factor in the fer- 

 tility of the soil. 



REFERENCES 



Sen Gupta, N. N., " Dephenolisation in Soil," Joiirn. Agric. 

 Science, vol. xi, 1921, pp. 136-58. 



Russell, E. J., and Hutchinson. H. B., " The Effect of Partial 

 Sterilisation of Soil on the Production of Plant Food," 

 Journ. Agric. Science, vol. iii, igog, pp. 11 1-44; vol. v, 

 1913, pp. 152-221. 



Cutler, D. W., Crump, L. M., and Sandon, H., " A Quantita- 

 tive Investigation of the Bacterial and Protozoan Popula- 

 tion of the Soil, with an Account of the Protozoan Fauna," 

 Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Land., Ser. B, vol. ccxi, 1922 

 pp. 3i7-iO- 



The Franco-Russian 

 Alliance 



By R. B. Mowat 



Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford 



The alliance between Frajice and Russia (1894 to 1917) 

 was, throughout its duration, even more of a European 

 mystery than the famous Triplice of Germany, Austria, 

 and Italy. Although the docimients of the Triple 

 Alliance were not published until 1919, careful observers 

 (like M. Herbette in Albin's Grands Traites) were able 

 to make surprisingly accurate guesses or inferences. 

 With regard to the Franco-Russian Alliance nearly all 

 the inferences made by historians and journalists 

 turned out to be wrong. Meanwhile the lips of the 

 very few French and Russians who knew the facts 

 remained absolutely sealed. It was not luitil the 

 War and the Russian Revolution had put an end 

 to the Franco-Russian diplomatic system that the 

 French Government, in order to disprove the mis- 

 representations of writers and speakers, published the 

 facts in an official Yellow Book. 



The makers of the Franco-Russian Alliance \^•ere 

 M. de Giers on the Russian side, and M. Ribot and 

 M. de Freycinet on the French side. The object of these 

 statesmen in framing the Alliance is fairly clear : it 

 was that their respective coimtries might live in 

 security. Nobody could seriously bring forward the 

 charge that the Franco-Russian Alliance aimed at 

 attacking anyone ; for the Alliance endured so long, 

 and was supported by so many different Ministries, 

 one after another, in Russia and in France. An 

 aggressive alliance can be made for a particular time 

 and object ; but an alliance which goes on year after 

 year, as it were indefinitely, cannot by the nature of 

 things be meant to attack anyone. 



From 1872 to 1894 France stood alone and was 

 practically at the mercy of Germany. She was really 

 only protected by the common sense and moderation 

 of Bismarck and his school, and by the public opinion 

 of Europe. But France could not permanently rely 

 on these things. In 1875 Bismarck became alarmed 

 at the apparent revi\-al of France and appears to have 

 been on the point of declaring a war, which France 

 would probably have totally failed to resist. In this 

 instance war was actually averted by the friendly 

 intervention of the British Foreign Office and Russian 

 Chancellery. 



In the early 'nineties, France had attained a position 

 in Europe \\-hich enabled her to offer considerable 

 inducements to Russia, in order to make an alliance. 

 Russia required capital for railways. France wanted 

 military security- Both Powers were interested in 

 maintaining European peace, but Russia seemed to be 

 so strong that nobody thought she required France's 

 military help. 



The Tsar .\lexander III, like his father, Alexander 

 II, was a peaceful man. But it was not the Tsar alone 

 who counted ; it was the vast bureaucratic machine 

 through which Russian policy had to be administered. 

 At the head of this bureaucracy in the 'nineties was 

 M. de Giers. 



Since the year 1882, on the retirement of the aged 

 Gortchakoff, M. de Giers had been Russian Minister 

 of Foreign Affairs. He was a tremendous worker. 

 He had mastered all the detail of the Chancellery ; 

 he was capable, silent, and self-effacing, and in no way 

 tried to impose his views on the Tsar. Actually the 

 views of Alexander and of his Minister of Foreign 

 Affairs coincided : they both wanted peace, and the 

 maintenance of the status quo. One of the good 

 qualities of M. de Giers was that he did not allow his 

 delight in the labour at his table in the foreign office 

 to deter him from travelling — one of the most benefi- 

 cent directions into which the activity of a really 

 peace-loving Minister can be directed. M. de Giers 

 was indefatigable in his visits to the Capitals of the 

 Great Powers of Europe — to Rome, Paris, Vienna, 

 Berlin. Towards the idea of a military alliance with 

 France he appears not at first to have been particularly 

 favourable ; but after conversations between himself 

 and M. de Laboulaye, French Ambassador at St. 

 Petersburg in 1S91, he became convinced that a 

 Franco-Russian alliance could be made to contribute 

 to the stability of Europe. 



The First Advances 



The documents which have been published by the 

 French Government trace the formation of the momen- 

 tous alliance from the summer of the year 1891. The 

 first important document in the collection is a letter, 



