DISCOVERY 



157 



dated August 21, 1891, from M. de Giers to M. Mohren- 

 heim, Russian Ambassador at Paris. This letter calls 

 attention to two recent events ; the first was a series 

 of conversations at St. Petersburg between M. de 

 Giers and M. de Laboulaye (who was actually on 

 the point of retiring from the Embassy at St. Petersburg 

 to give place to M. de MontebeUo). The second fact 

 was the supposed (and, as it is now known to be, 

 correctly supposed) renewal of the Triple Alliance 

 (see Discovery for December 1922, p. 316). 



Inviewof these facts, M.de Giers thought it advisable 

 that France and Russia should " define and perpetuate 

 the entente cordiale " which united them. He there- 

 fore made two suggestions : namely, that the two 

 Governments should agree (i) to "deliberate in 

 concert upon all questions of such nature as to put 

 the general peace in jeopardy"; (2) "to act in 

 concert upon those measures which the realisation 

 of that eventuality would make it necessary for both 

 Governments to adopt immediately and simultane- 

 ously. 



This letter, when passed on bj' M. Mohrenheim to 

 M. Ribot, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, elicited an 

 answer on August 27, 1891. This answer states that 

 the points in M. de Giers's letter had been " previously 

 contrived and formulated by common agreement of 

 the two Cabinets " (of Paris and St. Petersburg). 

 The entente of France and Russia was therefore to 

 be made more specific, so as to become something of the 

 nature of an alliance. M. Ribot accordingly accepted 

 the two suggestions contained in M. de Giers's letter 

 of .\ugust 21, and concluded by saying that the 

 problems arising out of this closer union would have to 

 be confided to the "practical study" of "special 

 delegates." 



The result of this practical study appeared almost 

 exactly a year later when, on August iS, 1892, the 

 Russian Chief of Staff, Obroutcheff, and the French 

 Sub-Chief of Staff, Boisdeffre, signed a Military 

 Convention at St. Petersburg. The preamble stated 

 that : 



France and Russia, animated by a common 

 desire to preserve the peace, and having no other 

 end in mind than to ward off the necessities of 

 a defensive war provoked by an attack of the forces 

 of the Triple Alliance against either of them, 

 have agreed upon the following provisions. 



I The main provisions were that if France was 



attacked by Germany (or b}- Italy supported by 



I Germany), Russia should come to her aid ; and that 

 if Russia were attacked by Germany (or bj' Austria 

 supported by Germany), France would come to her 

 aid. The two Powers were not to conclude a separate 

 peace. The Convention was to have the same dura- 

 tion as the Triple AUiance. This Convention was 



" definitively adopted in its present form " by exchange 

 of letters between M. de Giers and M. de MontebeUo 

 (French Ambassador at St. Petersburg) on December 

 27, 1893, and January 4, 1894. 



M. Delcasse's Part 



The next change in the Franco-Russian Alliance 

 comes with the period of M. Delcasse as Ministre des 

 Affaires etrangeres (1898-1905). M. Delcasse made 

 the aim of his public life to assure the safety of France. 

 This he aspired to do by drawing the alliance with 

 Russia closer, and by arranging either an alliance or 

 " entente " with Great Britain. 



In a letter of August 12, 1899, to President Loubet, 

 Delcasse pointed out the weak spot in the existing 

 Franco-Russian AUiance : the clause concerning dura- 

 tion which limited the AUiance to the duration of the 

 Triplice. If, for instance, wrote M. Delcasse, the 

 Austrian Empire should break up at the death of 

 Francis Joseph, the Triplice would dissolve and with 

 it the Franco-Russian .Alliance : " born of the Triple 

 Alliance, it would vanish with it." 



" What would happen," asked M. Delcasse, 

 ■■ ' if Austria were threatened by a dismemberment 

 which, perhaps, is after all desirable, which 

 perhaps might be comitenanced and which, in any 

 case, one might become anxious to turn to account ? 

 What could be more capable of compromising the 

 general peace and of upsetting the balance 

 between the European forces ? And what situa- 

 tion, furthermore, would deserve to find France 

 and Russia, not only united in a common plan, 

 but ready even for its execution ? Now it is just 

 at the precise moment when the mUitary conven- 

 tion should work, that it would cease to exist : 

 bom of the Triple AUiance, it would \'anish with 

 it. That is a deficiency which has constantly 

 troubled me since I became Minister of Foreign 

 Affairs." 



M. Delcasse had already discussed this with Count 

 Mura\-ieff (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs who 

 had succeeded M. de Giers) at Paris in October 1898. 

 The visit of the Russian Foreign Minister had been 

 returned by Delcasse, who arri\-ed at St. Petersburg 

 on Fridaj^ evening, August 4, 1899. ^^ Sunday, 

 August 6, M. Delcasse had breakfast with the Tsar 

 Nicholas II at Peterhof. Nicholas commented with 

 esteem and approval on Delcasse's judicious conduct 

 m the last Franco-British crisis (the Fashoda affair). 

 The two statesmen then discussed the Franco-Russian 

 AUiance : "I revealed to the Emperor my belief and 

 apprehension that the AUiance would be disanned in 

 case one of those very e\'ents should arise in view of 

 which it was formed." 



The Tsar admitted the reasonableness of M. Del- 

 casse's argument. 



