Nov. 1, 1885.] 



KNOWLEDGE * 



33 



24. K to R3 ! Q to B3 



25. Q to E7 (ch) K to B ?q. 



26. Q to R8 (ch) K to Kl> ! 



27. Q X R Q to (j.-) (ch) 



28. K to R sq. B x P 



29. R to K sq. (ch) 



This was bad ; R to KKt sq. was the correct move. 



R to K5 I 



30. R X R (ch) ? Q X R 



31. QxRP 



Carionsly enough, White cannot prevent the mate, escejjt by giving 

 np his R 



Resigns. 



P to Kt3 



tositiox aftbh the 31st movk is a game pr.ayed ix the 

 London Toursamest of 1883. 



ZrKEHTOBT— BlaCE. 



Stetsitz— White. 



In this difficult position, Zuliertort won by verj" good strategv. 

 White played — 



32. KR to Kt sq. P to B5 ! 



If, now, WTiite plays— 33. R x B, Q to Q3 [threatening Q to Q5 (ch)] ; 

 34. R to Q sq., R to Q sq., Blacls gets a weil-advanced and provi- 

 sionally-protected passed Pawn, while White's QRP is weak. Never- 

 theless, we think that White ousht to have simplified tlie game by 

 playing 33. R x B, then, if Q to Q3, 34. R to Qsq, R to Qsq ; 33. Q to 

 K3, P X B ; 36. R to Kt3, P to Q7 ; 37. R to Kt2, Q to Q.5 ; 38. K to 

 B2, and the game ought to be drawn. 



33. B to B2 P to P.6 : 



34. Q to K:i B to l;:J 



35. R to Kt6 R to B3 



36. P to R5 QR to QB sq. 



37. K to E2 Q to B5 



38. B to KtH Q to Q5 



39. B to Q5 R X R 



40. PxR PtoB7 



41. QxQ PxQ 



42. R to QB sq. P to Q6 



43. K to K3 R to Kt sq. 



44. P to Kt7 K to Kt2 



45. K to Q2 B X P 



46. B X B R X B 



47. K X P R to Kt6 (ch) 



48. K X P R X P 



and Black won. AVhite would not have done much better ifi 

 instead of 48. K x P, he had protected the EP by K to K2; for 

 Black replies with R to B6, and then brings up his K. 



A Fool Defined. — Erasmus Darwin defined a fool as "a man 

 who never tried an experiment in his lite." There is no escape 

 from a definition like this, as there is from such a saying as J. S. 

 Mills " Every fool is a Conservative." Mill could logically say it did 

 not follow that " every Conservative is a fool," — which, let us hope, 

 gave great comfort to the Conservative mind. We cannot, however, 

 say that Erasmus Darwin's definition leaves even one out who never 

 tried an experiment ; for a true definition does not err either in 

 excess or in defect. This definition therefore asserts that every 

 man who has tried no experiment in his life is a fool, as certainly 

 as it asserts that no fool ever tried an experiment. 



a^nv iLMn^t Column. 



A PROTEST AGAINST SIGNALS, 

 Br Mogul. 



the one quality wliich gives Whist its greatest 

 charm and favourably distinguishes it from Chess 

 and Double Dummy is the exercise it affords of 

 the faculty of reasoning from the known to the 

 unknown, the introduction into the game of 

 signals, which convey positive information with- 

 out exercising the reason, cannot but be regarded 

 as a great blot on, and as tending to lower the 

 character of the game, and to make it less 

 stieiniilc : and Pole outrages one's common sense in calling modem 

 Wliist, when compared with the Whist of Matthews, Arnaud, Des- 

 chapelles, and others, tlie " scientific game," when, in fact, it is only 

 the old really scientific game, with the addition of certain purely 

 mechanical and unscientific dodges, for giving information known as 

 signals. No wonder that Pembridge, in his last amusing and in- 

 structing brochure, " The Decline and Fall of Whist," which every 

 Whist student should read, calls all the signals "wooden arrange- 

 ments." The term is apt, as the veriest blockhead, after one ex- 

 planation, can make and imderstand a signal as well as the most 

 skilful player, for the very essence of a signal is that, by virtue of a 

 previous convention, it conveys certain definite information, and so 

 entirely does the meaning of a signal depend upon a prior conven- 

 tion, that two of the signals— viz., the Peter and the Penultimate — 

 conveyed at one time different information to that now conveyed by 

 them. Perhaps some readers of Cavendish will fancy that signals 

 or conventions (for they are really synonymous terms) are exten- 

 sions of principle ; but they are nothing of the sort, and Cavendish's 

 attempt to prove this is based entirely on unsound reasoning. If 

 any one doubts it, let him carefully analyse Cavendish's chapter on 

 the " Conversation of the Game," and he will be satisfied that tlie 

 author misapprehends the meaning of the word " convention, ' and 

 has false notions of what constitutes a principle, or else lie would 

 not talk of extending it as if a principle were something elastic. It 

 cannot be too clearly understood that signals are conventional modes 

 of conveying information and notliing else, and that pUyers can 

 easilj- invent as many of them as they like, cij., two, or more, 

 players can agree that an original lead of a card of a different 

 colour to the trump card should indicate a strong hand ; that the 

 lead of the smallest but one of a suit should indicate that the leader 

 held an honour in it, that the present mode of calling for trumps 

 should indicate a desire to be forced, and so on : and one can see 

 how two players playing frequently together, and practising their 

 peculiar signals, could tliereby get a considerable pull over their 

 adversaries. You (my readers) or I may consider that that would 

 be cheating; but the inventors would, of course, deny it, and quote 

 Clay as their justification, for does he not say, " It is fair to give 

 to your partner any intimation which could be given if the cards 

 were placed on the table each exactly in the same manner as the 

 others by a machine, the plavers being out of sight and hearing 

 of each other .' " And could not the suggested conventions be as well 

 played in the manner he thus specifies as fair, as any of the existing 

 Conventions ? Certainly they could, and thus it comes home to us that 

 Clay's argument, which has so constantly been relied on as esta- 

 blishing the fairness of signals, is unsound, and even if it be 

 considered that he assumed that signals were only '• fair '' when 

 known to or played by the other players, we should still feel — and I 

 doubt not that every honourable man does feel — that to make use 

 of signals against players who had never heard of them, and who, 

 even if they had the genius of a Desehapelles, could not by any 

 process of reasoning infer their exact meaning, would be unfair, and 

 only a shade less unfair to use them against adversaries who might 

 have heard of, but had never practised them, for the power of 

 noticing the signals grows by practice, and a beginner is unable to 

 discover them except by diverting his attention from other matters. 

 But, it may be asked, if conventions are both unscientific and to a 

 certain extent unfair, how is it that any of them have been adopted .' 

 The answer is rather complex, but we can easily imagine that when 

 snch a convention as the signal for trumps was first suggested, 

 whilst every one could see how useful it could be made, it would 

 not at first sight strike players as being out of harmony with the 

 spirit of the game, for after a man has pl.ayed Whist for some time 

 he draws inferences so rapidly as hardly to be aware of the process 

 of reasoning. I must admit that my eyes were first opened as to 

 their real character by the thoroughly fallacious reasoning of 

 Cavendish on introducing the "penultimate"; besides, as 

 soon as several men in a club determined to use the 

 signal, the rest must either have declined to play with them, 

 or else in self-defence have used it themselves ; but probably 



