June ], 1886.] 



♦ KNOWLEDGE * 



233 



J ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE ^ 

 ft€!ENCE,UTERATURE,& ART 



LONDON: JUNE 1, 188G. 



THE UNKNOWABLE. 



By Richard A. Phoctou. 



A DIGRESSION CONCERNIXfJ THK NAMK AND riJRPOSE 

 OF TIIESB; PAl'KKS. 



^S tlie purpose of this series of ai tides — 

 originally indieated very fully — sooius to 

 have been forgotten by many, and sevfiral 

 correspondents, as well as outside ciities, 

 have renewed the old mistake of deseri[)irig 

 the Unknowable as that of wliich we neither 

 know nor can conceive anything, I make 

 here a few I'emarks as to the fundamental 

 idea on which the recognition of the Unknowable depends. 



To unthinking persons, having it maybe feared somewhat 

 shallow niin<ls, it a|)pcars a.s though tliere could hardly be a 

 much greater Idunder than to speak of the Unknowable as 

 if we knew aught about It. Kven one of comjiarativoly 

 trained, though somewhat fanciful mind, like Mr. Frederick 

 Harrison, could jeer at Mr. Hpcncer for going so far 

 ai to .speak of the Power wliich lies at the back of all 

 phenomena as cert^iinly unknowable ; for, said Mr. Harrison, 

 it is " more philosophical not to assert of the unknown that 

 it is unknowable." Again, " to assert the presence of one 

 uniform energy," .said Mr. Harrison, " is to profess to know 

 something very important about the Unknowable," as if 

 nothing could possibly be known about that which is 

 admitted to be unknowable. 



iJut in reality wc not only know something, we know 

 what for us is much about the Unknowable. It may truly 

 be .said that all we know Ls knowledge about the Unknow- 

 able. ThLs sounds like saying, " We know all about the 

 Unknowable," or, more shortly, " We know the Unknow- 

 able," either of which is an utterly self-contradictoi-y s.'tying. 

 But in reality there is no sucli contradiction. Nay, one 

 may present with truth a seemingly more obvious paradox : 

 for one maj' truly say — 



Evei-ything we know we know about the Unknowable, 

 yet of the Unknowable we know (in effect) nothing. 



This which seems Sfj obviously and undeniably absurd is 

 simply a truism to all wlio have been le<l to contemplate the 

 Unknowable by advancing along the track which the students 

 of the knowable have followed until now, and which I am 

 tracing in these papers. 



In order to show that, instead of being a paradox, the 

 saying just imagined is a mere truism (in these days, and 

 for the thoughtful student of sc-ience), we may compare it 

 with either of the following manifest truisms : — 



Everything we know we know about the Universe ; yet of 

 the Universe we know (in effect) nothing. 



Everything we know about the occurrence of events we 

 know about events occurring during all Time ; yet of the 



events occurring during all Time we know (in effect) 

 nothing. 



Eveiything wo know about the diuie.nsious of bodies and 

 systcMiis in space anuuid us, we know about bodies and 

 systems occupying inlinito space; yi^t of InGnito Space wo 

 (in eilect) neitlxu' know nor can coneeivo anything. 



Kverything we know wo know about the InfMiite, for the 

 Finite is a part of tho Inlinito ; yet of the Inlinito we. (in 

 ellecl) neither know nor can conceive anything. 



Wo need not take inlinity, however, to find similar 

 apparent contradictious, which are in reality no contia- 

 dictions at all. Thus wo nuiy write : — 



Tho distances of tho millions of stars in our galaxy arn 

 unknown and unknowable ; yot wc know much about those 

 distances. 



Tho region around this earth's centre is unknown and 

 unknowable; yot wo know much about its nature and 

 condition. 



Tlu^ <lepths of octran must bo regarded as unknown and 

 unknowal)ki; yet we know a good deal about those di^ptlis 

 and their tenants. 



(Jr, to turn fi-om the grrat to the HUiall ; — 



Tho idtiniato stiaictiire of inicroscojiic foi'Uis (aniiiiate ami 

 inaniniat(!) is unknown and nuknowalilo; yet wo know a 

 good deal about it. 



Oi', to tak(; concrrete examples : — • 



The Emperor of All tlie llussias is unknowaldo for some 

 average Englishman, whose whole life is passed, say, in 

 Truro ; an<l the Cham of Tartary may oven bo so far 

 unknowable that of liis actual existence to-flay such an 

 Englishman may bo doubtful : yot that same Fnglishraan, 

 if decently educated, as an average Englishnian may bo 

 expected to be, knows a good deal about the Kinperor 

 of llussia, and could quote many |)asHagos from wi^ll known 

 authors relating to the (Jham of Tiirtary, in th(; days when 

 the (Ihani of Tartary was a reeogniHed power. 



Wliat I am trying to do in these papers is to show 

 how )iien of all races and in all ages have recognised 

 mystery and powi^r in the unknown which was for them 

 unknowable, their ideas of the uid<nown power' widening 

 as the domain of tlie known widened and so disclosed tho 

 ever-widening domain, the <!ver-deepening mystery of tho 

 unknown and the unknowable, until now the Unknowable 

 is recognised as without limits either in time or spiu:e. 

 Its mystery is too profound to br; fathomed. 



That this should seem like atheism to the ignorant, who 

 either need and believe in a Im'iUi deity, or else reject with 

 unnecessary indignation a deity of tliat sort (the only deity 

 suiting ignorant minds), is natural enough. As a shallow 

 critic has remaiked in the pages of a <»ntemporary — K<;ligiou« 

 and irreligious, meaning those who arrogate to themselves 

 the title religious and those who as arrogantly reject leligion, 

 agree in recognising Darwin and Spencer, Huxley and 

 Tyndall, and all who think like them, as atheists. Jiiit 

 then, the opinions of such persfjiis count simply as nothing. 

 The early Christians were promis(;d safety if they abjured 

 atheLsm, and doubtless their belief seemed like atheism to 

 thebeliever-s in the divinity of sun, moon, and planets, or of 

 other nature-gods ; but the early ChrLstians knew that they 

 were not atheists, and reganled the belief of those outside 

 their body as the true atheism for their day. So the student 

 of science of our day knows that his belief is not atheism, 

 but that it would l)e actual atheism in hiw, to acc<;pt the 

 finite deity believed in by tho ignorant (a deity, to use 

 Matthew Ai-nold's words, not less familiarly known than 

 " some angry man in the next street ") as truly repre- 

 senting the Infinite Power which resides in all things, and 

 of which all phenomena are the uuexphiined and inexplicablo 

 manifestations. 



