Feb. 10, 1882.] 



KNOWLEDGE 



329 



versaries as little information as possible aa to the number one 

 holds, and for that reason one ought, as a rule, to play the turn- 

 up card, when a small one, as soon as possible. Giving iuforiuation 

 in the ease of an adverse lead of trumps is so, it setms to me, 

 Bacrificing the real object in play, viz., trick getting to the princii)le 

 of giving information, which is only a means to an end. But this 

 is a result to which the teaching of those who make this principle 

 their hobby, and assert it to be the basis of modern scientific Whist, 

 necessarily leads. The principle of giving information of strength 

 to a partner is as old as the game itself, and is sound, because, 

 as a rule, it is information by which a partner can gain 

 more advantage than the adversvries, but I am sure that to tell the 

 table of one's weakness is giving information of which the adver- 

 saries can avail themselves more to one's detriment, than a partner 

 can to one's advantage. It anyone doubts it, let him play dummy. 

 If dummy's partner, he will find how much less use it is to him to 

 know dummy's cards when dummy is weak, than when he is strong. 

 If dummy's adversary, he will, on the contrary, find that he can take 

 much more advantage of knowing dummy's weakness than he can of 

 his strength. So that, judging by experience and by reasoning, I 

 believe that the old mle of trying to conceal weakness, even at the 

 risk of deceiving your partner as well as your adversary, is sound. 

 I dwell upon this point, because it is one on which I consider 

 "Five of Clubs " essentially wrong. He, at page 42, says in effect 

 that there is no limit to the principle " that it is more important to 

 inform your partner than to deceive your adversary." If this be true, 

 A and W playing against T and Z wonid gain an advantage by being 

 allowed to expose their hands on the table, whilst Fand Z held up 

 theirs. But does any reasonable man believe this ? 1 supjiose not, 

 bntif not, there is some limit. JjCt us apply a further test. Suppose 

 A is permitted to expose his entire hand whenever he chooses, but 

 has to pl:iy it him.iclf, does " Five of Clubs" really contend that A 

 would be wise to do so when he has a weak hand ? If he docs not. he 

 admits a still further limit to what he calls the great principle of 

 the modem scientific game, and really comes back to the principles 

 tanght by Hoyle and Mathews. I am aware that " Five of Clubs" 

 gays that these two are out of date, but 1 am not alone in the 

 opinion that Jtathews' treatise is the one of all others most likely 

 to dcvclopc the powers of a player, to make him use the rules as 

 his servant. ■^, instead of being their servant, and to enable him to 

 cross the lino which divides the mere book player Irom the first- 

 class player. 



One word more, and I have done. Will " Five of Clubs " refer 

 to his observation 9, p. 28-1-, and explain why Z, after two rounds 

 of clubs, will, because F plays the ten, be able to place the Knave 

 of Clubs in r's hand ? F's play of the Club ten strikes me as 

 decidedly bad ; he was, of course, bound to keep up the small Club, 

 but as it could not matter which of the three higher ones he 

 played if Z held the Queen of Clubs, as well as the Ace and King, 

 he was bound to play on the assumption that Z held only the Ace 

 and King ; now, by playing the ten, Y would tell Z that the nine 

 was in the hands of the adversaries, and Z would properly con- 

 clude that if either adversary held the Queen or Knave with the 

 he, Z, could not get the command of the suit by leading the 

 :ind would, therefore, feel bound to load a small one upon the 

 • of T holding the Queen, the very thing which }', having 

 lubs, ought to try to prevent Z doing. — Mogi'l. 



ir.i obliged to MoGi'L for pointing out what he considers to be 

 in my views respecting Whist strategy, because in this, as in 

 .er matters depending on experience and reasoning combined, 



■ ith can only be got at by what may be described as a system 

 ::A and error. With regard to " Mogul's " general view on the 



'U, whether is is better or not to give as much information to 

 :i'-r as can be given consistently with the rules of the 

 I may for the present content myself with the re- 

 : that modern Whist adopts the principle which he con- 

 - unsound, and that, this being so, one can hardly depart 

 it without actually deceiving partner (which is not quite 

 ime thing as failing to inform him). Clay has clearly shown 



■ chapter on False Cards, that the result of attempting to keep 

 Iversaries in ignorance of the constitution of one's hand may 

 - way be most mischievous. It may be the case that in a 

 .liar hand, giving information of weakness may do more harm 

 an be compensatod by any advantage ; but, in the long run, 



■ ni play in each hand (up to the point when the strategy of 

 md has been fully developed) is best, the play of false cards 



■ uiiu hand (though, perhaps, saving frpm immediate disaster) 

 I 'OdiDg to doubt and mistmst in many others. 



I' In passing, I may note that playing dummy (single dummy, pre- 

 umably, is meant) is not a trustworthy test of the system of 

 lodem Whist ; for, in a number of cases, what may be information 

 \> one's partner in the usual game may be no information at all to 

 '■ "• adversaries. I 



If anything I said at page 42 means in effect that thtre is -no 

 limit to the principle " that it is more important to inform vour 

 partner than to deceive your adversary," then I certainly said what 

 was entirely and egregiously wrong. It is often absolutely essential 

 to success in the closing rounds of a hand to deceive the adversarj-, 

 whether partner be at the same time deceived or not. 



Turning now to the game at ]i. 28-1, I note first that I entirely 

 differ from " Mogul " as to Z'a policy in playing five of trumps anil 

 holding up four (the turn-up card). 'l had not expressed approval— 

 timply noted why Z had done this. But tho reason which 

 " Mogul " urges against Z's play does not exist. The adverse lead 

 of trumps is not such as to indicate more strength than Z possesses 

 himself. .4 has led trumps when his o>vn suit is exhausted from 

 one of his adversaries' hands as well as from his partner's. Z can 

 be certain that A has not more than four trumps one honour, or 

 three trumps two honours, for if he had had more he would have led 

 trumps earlier, with such strength as he had (and has already 

 shown) in spades and diamonds. Now Z has himself four trumps, 

 headed by Ace, ten. He has a long suit headed by Ace, King' 

 Queen. His only chance is in i>laying as with strength in 

 trumps J and his policy is therefore to show his partner all 

 he can of his tramp suit. The game is gone anyway if 

 Z's strength in trumps shall prove insufficient to bring in the 

 long suit, and he simply plays as if he knew for certain that he had 

 sufficient strength. If the score were " love all," the case would be 

 different ; Z's policy would then have been to play a backward game, 

 so as to lose as few by tricks as i)ossibIe. But playing a backward 

 game as the score stood would have been the same thing as throw- 

 ing up the cards. 



Similar remarks apply to Y's play at trick 9, which was rather 

 warmly canvassed after the evening's play. Consider what 1' 

 knows, what Z knows, and (which is quite another question, and 

 very often overlooked) what Y knows that Z knows. 1' knows that 

 the Diamond King cannot be with Z, or Z would have played it as 

 soon as trumps were out. He knows that Z cannot credit 1' wrongly 

 with the Diamond King, for at trick 2 1' would have put it on A'b 

 Queen, if he had had it. Z knows his partner has no more spades 

 (this is clear from A'a play in leading trumps at trick a, 

 which he would not have done if there were two Spades outside his 

 own hand — knowing his pai-tner with none). Z, then, can put three 

 Spades in A's hands, three Diamonds at least (from penultimate 

 lead, and four if he has noticed that the lead was really from the 

 ante-penultimate) in B's hand, headed by Diamond King. Also 

 from B's discard of Club five, when only one trick was wanting 

 to win, Y knows that if Z has not the Queen himself he will 

 certainly not place it in h's hand. Thus Y knows that if Z has 

 not Ace, King, and three Clubs, he would throw up the 

 cards, for in that case one trick munt go to AB. He 

 knows that Z is certain to draw the Queen if it lies 

 with A. And he sees that among the various cards, including 

 Queen, with which Z mitjht credit 1', there is only one which would 

 justify the lead of a small card ; viz., it 1' held ten. Knave, Queen, 

 and no other Club. But as Z ought to know A with only two 

 Clubs, and B with only one (it is not l''s fault if Z has not noticed 

 B's ante-i)cnultiinate lead— tricks 2 and 3), Y must have four Clubs. 

 By playing as liedoes, then Y does, not run the risk Mogul suggests ; 

 while if Z has Ace, King, and draws the Queen from .1 (who, so far as 

 r knows, may hold it), Z will know from l"s play in the second round 

 of Clubs that Knavo must lie with him, his attention being in the most 

 marked manner called to this by the unusual play of 10 before 9. 

 As I said in the notes, this was not essential to t^e success of Z Y, 

 for if Z played according to the fall of the cards, he could not fail 

 to draw Vs Knave with a small card (if not holding Queen), but it 

 was well to call his attention to the point. Note that if Z had 

 been inattentive to the earlier play, and supposed Y to have 

 held originally either Queen, Knave, ten, and a small one, or 

 Queen, ten, and a small one (we are considering the matter from 

 Y point of view, who does not know that Z holds tho Queen), it 

 would be unnecessary to lead a small one, for Vs small one could 

 be used, after Queen and Knave were played in one case, or Queen 

 in the other, to put the lead again in Z's hands. If Z thought 

 that Y held Queen and ten only, originally, playing a small one 

 would be fatal, as, after winning with Queen, Y would have no 

 Club left. With only one hand out of four |)ossiblc ones, would 

 lead of small one be right — viz., if 1' had Queen, Knave, ten, in 

 which case if Z played the Ace before the small one, Y winning 

 third trick in Clubs, would have no Club to return with. Only 

 one chance in four suggesting lead of small one, Z would, of course, 

 play the King. As a matter of fact, he ought to know that )' 

 could not hold that particular hand. I am disposed to think )' 

 displayed unnecessary ingenuity — which, as I chanced to be his 

 partner — was perhaps, natural, for partners seldom criticise without 

 prejudice. 



Five of Clubs. 



