.Makcu 2, 1883.] 



♦ KNOWLEDGE ♦ 



139 



^ur WB^iiit Column. 



Er " Five of Cldbs." 



^111 E crilical moment iu almost every hand of Whist is that when 

 J. one nr other side enters on the trump lead. This may occur 

 early : perhaps at the very beginning, when one side or the 

 other has a decided superiority in trumps ; or in the middle 

 of the game, when one side or the other, having esta- 

 blished a suit, and being well protected in their adversaries' 

 suits, sees that their trump strength, reinforced by their strength 

 in plain suits, gives promise of wresting the command of the 

 hand from the other side ; .or the strength in trnmp and plain 

 ■aits may be so disposed that neither side cares to lead trnmps till 

 towards the end of the hand ; or both sides may tind advantage 

 in reserving trumps for ruffing; or two partners may try to establish 

 a cross ruff, throwing the command of trumps, if they succeed, 

 into their opponents' hands, but safely enough, because more tricks 

 are usually gained by the cross ruff than the opponents can after- 

 wards make out of their suits, cut up by the raffing game ; so 

 that, lastly, a trump lead may be purely defensive, made simply to 

 prevent a cross-ruff from being established. 



The skill of a \Vhist-j>layer is shown more, perhaps, by his apti- 

 tude in selecting the i)roi)er moment wiien triunps should be led, 

 or the enemies' strength in trumps reduced by forcing, or tlieir 

 lead of trumps delayed by properly placing the lead, than by any 

 other {larts of Whist strategy. And I would at the outset carefully 

 caution the learner against falling into the habit of regarding the 

 use of trumps to be so pre-eminently that indicated by the book- 

 authorities, that all other uses should be considered relatively un- 

 important. It may be true that the chief use of trumps is to 

 extract the enemies' trumps so as to bring in a long suit ; but this 

 use, thongh more important than any other considered separately, 

 is not more important than all the others put together, as many 

 book-players seem to imagine. 



It should be remembered, indeed, that in the majority of hands 

 no long suit is brought in, the ending depending simply on the 

 correct play or skilful finesse of the cards remaining in hand, which 

 may be the fragments of suits never veiy long or strong, and broken 

 up through discards enforced by the necessity of protecting other 

 suits. To adopt as rules of play a system depending on what 

 hap|>en3 often enough indeed, but still only in a minority of all the 

 games played, is unsafe ; yet many follow the rules for trying to 

 bring in a long suit, as if this were the common end of every hand. 



Let it be remembered that though leading originally from the 

 longest suit, discarding from the sliortest (if trumps not declared 

 against you) and other such rales, are good enough in the 

 early stages of the play of a hand, because they bring the 

 partners into alliance, so to speak, they mast not be held to 

 sanction the general principle of playing to bring in a long 

 suit. This is in reality phiying a forward game, and a great 

 number of hands require backward, or defensive play, while 

 the majority of hands do not justify forward play. You show 

 your long suit and your partner shows his, or you learn his 

 from the play of the enemy or from the discards, and you presently 

 get an inkling as to the strength of the several suits in the different 

 hands. Bat you must not run away with the idea that so soon as 

 you know this, the time has come to scheme for the bringing iu of a 

 long suit which you or your partner may possess. On the contrary, it 

 is as likely that by this time, you will have found that the measures 

 good for bringing in your suit, are as good for bringing in a suit of 

 the enemies', and that the enemies' suit and not yours is the one 

 which would probably be brought in. And it is more likely than 

 not, that cither your chance is thus luifavourable, or, though not 

 bad in itseif, it is yet not good enongh to justify auy attempt at a 

 forward game. 



At such a stage ni the game, if you find reason to think that you 

 and your partner between you can hold your own fairly against the 

 enemy in trumps, and there is no chance of establishing a cross 

 ruff, it may be well to follow the rale not to force partner if weak 

 in trumps. But if it has become clear that your partner as well as 

 Tooiself is weak in trumps, you may fairly reason that, since it is 

 the enemies* game to prevent your trumps and your partner's from 

 Iieing used in ruffing, it can hardly be bad policy to force yom- 

 partner. For though the chief object of leading trumps is 

 nndoubtedly to draw out trnmps and bring in a long suit, 

 there is another very important object, viz., to draw out 

 tnunps lest they be used in ruffing. After all, you can 

 do very little harm, even if your partner's strength is snch 

 that he prefers to pass the trick. He , can discard a useless 

 card, if he prefers that course ; but if, like yourself, he is weak, 

 he can make a trick with a trump which would otherwise have 



simply fallen to the enemy. He may, perhaps, bo found also 

 with the King card and another of one of the adversaries' suits, in 

 which you may be short, and may play that suit (King card first, of 

 course), giving you the chance of forcing him again. If yon can 

 make two or three tricks thus with your weak trumjjs, you may be 

 content to give up any attem|>t to face the enemy in trumps — espe- 

 cially as, when they do get in, they will hardly be able to avoid 

 letting some of their trumps fall in pairs to none from you and yotu- 

 portner. 



(To be contintied.) 



©ur Cbfss Column. 



By IIepuisto. 



END OF AN ACTUAL GAME. 



Amateur. 

 Black. 



VTiuis. 

 Mepoisto. 



In this position White announced mate in sis moves, playing as 

 follows : — 



1. R tks P (eh) K takes R 



2. RtoRsq.(eh) Kt to E4 



3. RtksKt(ch) KtoKt2(best) 



[ 4. R to R7 (ch) K takes R 

 5. Q to R3 (ch) K to Kt2 

 G. Q to R6 mate. 



On February 17 ilephisto played against twenty members of the 

 North London Chess Club twenty simultaneous games. Play 

 bean at 7.15 p.m., the first game was finished at 7.45, the twentieth 

 at 10.15. Thus in three hours the twenty games were concluded. 

 Of that number the single player won sixteen and lost four. 



Taking the average number of moves per game at thirty, 

 5Iei)histo must have moved 600 times, or at the rate of 200 moves 

 per hour. 



The question has often beeu asked, what is it that constitutes a 

 strong player ? We venture to assert that it is not " strong 

 reasoning alone," but also the facility for accumulating experience 

 bv a good memory, both combined produce in coarse of time a 

 quick perception of position, commonly called " instinct," and very 

 commonly misinterpreted. The greater the experience, and also the 

 more the' reasoning powers are exorcised, the quicker will a person 

 be able to judge which is the right thing. If, therefore, a strong 

 practitioner perceives a fallacy, he will seize upon it at once, and 

 with a rapidity surprising to others less gifted than himself. 

 JlcpUisto was guided in his pla.y by " what comes nearer to instinct 

 than to reason," the result proving that it is " instinct " as defined 

 above which is the cliief guide, and it is left to the reasoning 

 powers to follow up and examine what the instinct has pointed ont 

 as a likely course, which in some instances requires modifying, and 

 in but very few instances re<iuires to be rejected. Undoubtedly, 

 reasoning increases the strength of play, but our argument is that 

 the greater part of a player's judgment of a position is supplied to 

 him instinctively, as is amply proved by the play in which reason- 

 ing powers, owing to the rapidity of moving, could not have been 

 exercised to any appreciable extent. Nevertheless, the result proved 

 satisfactory. 



