66 



- KNOWLEDGE ♦ 



[Aug. 3, 1883. 



ties, developed by the selective action of the same wasps, 

 are almost exactly similar. On the other hand, we have 

 in England a second epipactis, confined to marshy situa- 

 tions, and in all essential particulars practically identical 

 with the liroad-leaved species ; but it is fertilised by the 

 honey bee, by certain flies, and by some other colour-loving 

 insects, and therefore, instead of being dull purple or brown, 

 it is prettily variegated with pink and white — being, in 

 fact, one of our daintiest and most beautiful native 

 orchids. This case admirably exemplifies the powerful 

 influence of the insect guests on such easily-modified 

 points as colour and dappling. Another wasp - flower 

 which, though not exactly British, has been planted 

 in our shrubberies and borders till it has become 

 practically naturalised, is the snowberry, whose small, round, 

 bell-shaped blossoms and pulpy white fruit are familiar 

 to everybody. By descent the snowberry is a member of 

 the honeysuckle family ; but it has acquired the habit of 

 being fertilised mainly by wasps, and it has adapted itself 

 accordingly to their needs and requirements. Instead of 

 a narrow deep tube like the true honeysuckle, be- 

 loved by long - tongued humming - bird hawk - moths, 

 it has got a short, shallow, goblet - shaped corolla, 

 exactly fitted for the accommodation of a wasp's 

 head. In colour the flower is rather pinkier and prettier 

 than the figworts or the greater broomrape, but then it is 

 also more dependent for occasional chances \ipon other 

 colour-loving insects. It has not yet completely specialised 

 itself for wasps alone, and in some places it is almost 

 equally visited by hive-bees. Lastly, I must not forget to 

 mention the most famous wasp-flower of all, that of the 

 edible fig, whose fruits cannot be properly set without the 

 intervention of a closely-correlated insect ally, known as 

 the fig-wasp. Figs are practically what is called in the 

 technical language of botany, ditccious — that is to say, the 

 stamen-bearing and seed-bearing flowers grow separately 

 on distinct trees, for the female flowers are abortive in 

 some cases, and the male ones in others. Only the female, 

 or fruit^producing trees, are cultivated. The wild caprifico 

 of Italy supplies the complementary males. The fig-wasps 

 lay their eggs in the fruit of the caprifico, and there the 

 young hatch out. Then the peasants hang the caprifico 

 fruits on the fig-tree, so that the wasps, on flying out 

 covered with pollen, may at once enter the yoimg figs. 

 The whole history of these wasps and the figs which they 

 impregnate is a marvellously interesting one, but it is too 

 long and far too complicated to enter into at full length 

 here. It must suffice to note that the fig inflorescence is 

 just as dingy green or dull purple as all the other known 



THE MOKALITY OF HAPPINESS.* 



By Thomas Foster, 

 conduct and duty. 



MORALITY relates to those parts of our conduct of 

 which it can be said that they are right or -wTong. 

 Under the general subject conduct, then, morality is in- 

 cluded as a part. Or regarding the word " duty " as 

 implying all that we ought to do and all that we ought to 

 avoid, we may say that duty is a part of conduct. All 

 actions which are not purposeless may be regarded as 

 included under the word " conduct," as well as some 



" * I remind the reader tliat in these papers, as stated in the intro- 

 ductory one, I am followinf; the lines along which Mr. Herbert 

 Spencer has alre.-sdy traced the general doctrine of the morality of 

 happiness. Where his reasoning seems open to objection or too 



which, though purposeless at the time, result from actions 

 originally done with purpose until a fixed habit had been 

 acquired. But only those actions which we consider good 

 or bad are referred to when we speak of duty ; and the 

 principles of what we call morality relate only to these. 



Here, however, we have already recognised a connection 

 between duty and conduct generally, which should show 

 all who are familiar with scientific methods that morality 

 cannot properly be discussed in its scientific aspect without 

 discussing conduct at large. Every student of science 

 knows that rightly to consider a part, he must consider 

 the whole to which it belongs. In every department of 

 science this general law holds, though it is not always 

 recognised. No scientific subject has ever been properly 

 dealt with until it has been considered in its relations to 

 its surroundings as well as separately. Even in matters 

 not usually considered from a scientific standpoint the 

 same law holds. To go no farther than our own pages, 

 the writer who is dealing with the question " How to get 

 strong ? " would not consider how the arms are to be 

 strengthened without duly considering that the arms are 

 part of the body, their exercise related to the exercise of 

 other portions, their development associated with the de- 

 velopment of other limbs, with the action of other parts of 

 the body, with the regimen proper for the whole frame. 



It may not by many be regarded as a fault of most 

 systems of morality, that they overlook the necessarj' con- 

 nection between conduct in general and conduct as guided 

 by moral considerations. For, many are content to regard 

 moral laws as existing apart from any of the results of 

 experience — whether derived from individual conduct, the 

 conduct of men generally, or conduct as seen among 

 creattu"es of all orders. With many, morality is looked 

 upon as a whole, — the wliole duty of man — not as a part of 

 conduct. They even consider that moral obligations must 

 be weakened when their dependence on conduct in general 

 is insisted upon. Moral rules, with them, are right in 

 themselves and of necessity — and whether inculcated by 

 extra-human authority, or enjoined by law, or perceived 

 intuitively, are open neither to inquiry nor objection. Clearly 

 if this were so, morality would not be a fitting subject for 

 the scientific method. Its rules would be determinable 

 apart from the discussion of evidence based on experience 

 whether observational or experimental. I do not here 

 inquire whether this view is right or wrong. Later on it 

 will fall into my plan to do so. At present I only note 

 that we are considering our subject from the standpoint 

 of those who desire to view morality in its scientific aspect. 

 For them it is essential that as conduct in general includes 

 conduct depending on duty, the discussion of questions of 

 duty cannot be complete or satisfactory unless it is con- 

 ducted with due reference to the whole of which this subject 

 forms a part. 



If any doubt could exist in the mind of the student on 

 this point, it should be removed when he notes that it is 

 impossible to draw any sharply defined line between duty 

 and the rest of conduct not depending on considerations 



recondite to be quite readily followed, I shall indicate such 

 objections, and my own opinion respecting them, or endeavour to 

 remove such difficulties, but the moral doctrine I am here dealing 

 with is that of which he has been the chief teacher, if he may not 

 be regarded as its only founder. Even if the scientific study of 

 Ethics, on principles analogous to those which have made astro- 

 nomy, geology, and more recently biology, true sciences, has been 

 taken up by others and pursued till new truths have been recognised 

 and perhaps some errors pointed out in his treatment of it, it 

 remains still true that he was the first to indicate the true scientific 

 method, and to show where hitherto it had been departed from 

 even by the founders of the school of philosophy to which he 

 belongs. 



