Sept. 28, 1883.] 



♦ KNOWLEDGE • 



199 



room more or less fast, and there are probably an equal 

 number of hundreds more or less slow. This is precisely 

 the state of affairs that every astronomer likes. He 

 would, under such circumstances, tolerate even watches 

 that were very far wrong. It is quite possible that one or 

 two of the watches present may have stopped altogether ; 

 they were not wound last night, or the spring is broken. 

 Shall we then exclude such watches when we proceed to 

 take the mean 1 It is unnecessary to do so. Even if a 

 •watch were five or six hours behind time it would only 

 make the mean slow by about one-third of a minute, and 

 in all probability this would be compensated liy some other 

 watch several hours too fast. The principle is sufficiently 

 obvious. Each watch represents a more or less accurate 

 attempt to tell the time. There is no particular bias 

 for the watches to be fast rather than to be slow, and 

 the greater the number the more accurate will the mean be. 

 The moral is obvious. If we wish to determine the sun's 

 distance the method employed must admit of a very large 

 number of measures being made. [About] half will be too 

 large, [about] half will be too small, and the mean of all 

 will afford a result which may be relied on. The various 

 considerations I have brought forward may be considered to 

 merge in tlie general condition that any proposed method 

 must admit of the determination being made to within a 

 thousandth part of its total amount. With this canon of 

 criticism I shall briefly review the various methods in use, 

 and in doing so I am glad to acknowledge how much I 

 have profited by the labours of Mr. Gill, her Majesty's 

 Astronomer at the Cape of Good Hope, who has, with 

 characteristic energy, devoted himself to the discussion of 

 this problem. 



(To he continued.) 



THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS. 



By Thomas Foster. 



CHAPTER IV.— RIGHT AND WRONG. 

 (Continued from page 167.) 



IN its scientific aspect, then, as indicated by processes of 

 evolution, conduct is good in proportion as it tends to 

 increase the quantity and the fulness of life, bad in pro- 

 portion as it exerts a contrary influence. Conduct may 

 tend to increase life in its fulness directly or indirectly, 

 proximately or remotely ; and again conduct may in one 

 aspect increase while in another aspect it may diminish 

 the fulness and quantity of life : but our definition of 

 good and bad conduct is not aflected by such considera- 

 tion.s. Just as a knife may be a good knife for cutting 

 bread and a bad knife for cutting wood, just as a business 

 transaction may be good in relation to some immediate 

 purpose yet bad when remoter eflects are considered, so 

 can we truly apply to conduct the terms i/ood and bad 

 in reference to one sot of considerations even though wo 

 may have to invert the terms when conduct is considered 

 in reference to another set of considerations. But always, 

 in its scientific aspect, conduct is to be regarded as good 

 where it increases life or the fulness of life, and bad where 

 it tends the contrary way. 



When we separate conduct ethically indifferent from 

 conduct in its strict ethical aspect, it is convenient to sub- 

 stitute for the words tjood and bad the words riy/it and 

 ivronij. But the change is slighter than at first sight it 

 appears. Indeed the more carefully the question of 

 Tightness or wrongness, — the question of dutij., — is con- 

 sidered, the more thoroughly does the kind of conduct 



judged to be morally indifterent merge into that which 

 we regard as praiseworthy or censurable. 



Taking first those parts of conduct which relate directly 

 to the quantity or to the fulness of individual life, we 

 find that while the terms good and bad are freely applied 

 to them, and even the terms right and wrong, they are for 

 the most part regarded as morally indifi'erent. When we 

 say you ouijld to do this or to refrain from that, the idea 

 of duty is often not really present, so long as the act in 

 question relates to a man's own life or its fulness. Even 

 when we use words of praise or censure in relation to such 

 acts, they do not imply that a moral obligation has been 

 discharged or neglected. The reason doubtless is that, as a 

 rule, men need little encouragement to look after those 

 parts of their conduct which affect themselves and 

 their own interests. For it may be observed that 

 where it is likely there may be want of due care or 

 wisdom in such matters, there we find distinct ex- 

 ceptions to the general rule just indicated. So far as 

 quantity and fulness of life are concerned, the man who 

 crosses a crowded thoroughfare carelessly, he who neglects 

 his business, and he who wears insufficient or unsuitable 

 clothes in cold and wet weather, act with as little pro- 

 priety iu their adjustments, as is shown by the man who 

 steadily drinks intoxicating liqior?. But while none 

 preach such duties as caution in street crossing, prudence 

 and energy in business, and care about clothing, at least as 

 duties morally obligatory, quite a number of persons 

 preach against steady and heavy drinking as against 

 a moral offence. The Bible indeed does not, though 

 it has many a word of advice against wine-bibbing ; 

 yet even in the Bible we find evidence of the early existence 

 of total abstainers, and it is altogether unlikely that those 

 ancient Blue-Ribbonists omitted to recognise sinfulness in 

 all who did not share their views and follow their practices. 

 Here we find evidence of the law of moral philosophy that 

 a system of ethics, with recognition of moral rightness and 

 wrongness, only begins to be formed where the best conduct 

 (so far as fulness of life is concerned) runs the chance, for 

 whatever reason, of being neglected, and inferior conduct 

 followed. In this case, the best conduct is apt to be 

 neglected because the increased fulness of life to which it 

 conduces is more remote than the temporary increase of 

 life fulness to which inferior conduct tends. 



Yet speaking generally it may be said that as Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer puts it, — "The ethical judgments we pass 

 on self-regarding acts are ordinarily little emphasised ; 

 partly because the promptings of the self-regarding desires, 

 generally strong enough, do not need moral enforcement, 

 and partly because the promptings of the other self-regard- 

 ing desires, less strong, and often over-ridden, do need 

 moral enforcement." 



When we turn to the life-regarding actions of the second 

 class, those which relate to the rearing of offspring, we no 

 longer find the words good and bad, right and wrong, used 

 with doubtful meaning. Here the question of duty is 

 clearly recognised. The conduct of parents who by 

 neglecting to" provide for their children's wants in infancy, 

 diminish their chances of full and active life, or of life 

 itself, is called Ijad and wrong not solely or chiefly because 

 it is not favourable to the increase of life, but as open to 

 moral censure. In like manner, men blame as really 

 wrong, not merely unwise or ill-adjusted, such conduct as 

 tends to make the physical and mental training of children 

 imperfect or inadequate. 



Still clearer, however, is the use of the words right and 

 wrong as applied to conduct by which men influence in 

 various ways the lives of their fellows. Here the adjust- 

 ments suitalile for increasing the fulness of individual life 



