134 



DISCOVERY 



discern why they failed. The issues at stake were too 

 great, and of too vital an importance to one or more of 

 the States involved, to be settled by any of the feeble and 

 ineffective organs which the Concert of Europe had then 

 at its disposal. The deep causes of these unprevented 

 and (in the circumstances) almost inevitable wars were 

 broadly one or other of two ; they may be briefly 

 distinguished by the labels " national " and " im- 

 perial." The Italian war of 1859 ^^^ ^ national war. 

 It was necessary to expel the Austrians from the 

 I>eninsula, and in the middle of the nineteenth century 

 there was no means of doing it except by fighting. 

 Such a gigantic task was quite beyond the competence 

 of the then existing Concert of Europe. To prevent in 

 the future such a war as that of Italian libetation a 

 " League of Nations " will have to possess immense 

 legislative and executive powers. Similarly the Prus- 

 sian wars of 1864-70 were national. The grand issue, 

 foreseen by Bismarck and his associates, was the unifica- 

 tion of Germany under the Prussian hegemony. The 

 attempt to effect this end by constitutional and parlia- 

 mentary means had conspicuously failed in the years 

 1848-52, and Bismarck had clearly perceived and 

 plainly said that " not by speeches and resolutions of 

 majorities are the mighty problems of the age to be 

 solved, but by blood and iron." The unification of 

 Germany under the Hohenzollems necessitated on the 

 one hand the extrusion of the Hapsburgs, and on the 

 other the destruction of the hostile empire of Napoleon 

 III. In the existing condition of things nothing but 

 war could accomplish these requisite tasks. So, too, no- 

 thing but war could in 1877 secure the emancipation of 

 the Bulgarian nation from the Turkish yoke. National 

 problems Uke the Italian, the German, and the Bul- 

 garian involved political disintegration and reconstruc- 

 tion of so radical a character as to baffle all the re- 

 sources of nineteenth-century diplomacy. The Concert 

 of Europe could do much to preserve peace by the 

 maintenance of the stattts quo : it could do little or 

 nothing to preserve peace by the diplomatic facilitation 

 of the transition to the status ad quern. So much for 

 the national causes of the great nineteenth-century wars. 

 The other leading cause was imperial ambition — an 

 ambition not limited to an imperial ruler, but shared 

 by an imperial army, and supported and applauded by 

 an imperial people. The Crimean War — one of the most 

 unnecessary and futile conflicts in the world's history — 

 was forced upon a reluctant but bewildered Europe by 

 the insane lust for military glory which possessed 

 Napoleon III, and by the unyielding pride and obstinacy 

 of Nicholas I of Russia. Mediation and persuasion 

 were lost upon autocrats of the temper of these two. 

 Behind them, however, were two nations each of them 

 infected by the belligerent passions that made the 

 foolish struggle unavoidable. Thus, too, was it in 1914. 



In vain did Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues exhaust 

 the resources of conciliation to prevent the outbreak 

 of the world war. German imperial ambition had 

 deliberately prepared the conflict, and no human power 

 then extant could avail to stop it or postpone it. And 

 behind the German Emperor stood the German army 

 eager for the long-anticipated " fresh and joyous 

 fight," while behind the German army, and confident 

 of its invincible power, stood the German nation wait- 

 ing to exploit the earth. Against such a formidable 

 imperial "will to war" the Concert of Europe was 

 helpless. If in future a " League of Nations " is to be 

 effective in similar conditions, it will need to be very 

 strong indeed, and very quick in action. 



VI 

 Both the successes and failures of the nineteenth- 

 centur}^ Concert of Europe are instructive. Its very 

 considerable successes point the path along which the 

 nations may securely tread towards that goal of per- 

 petual peace which they now so ardently seek to attain. 

 They show that problems of all kinds are amenable 

 to peaceful settlement ; that a body of international 

 morality and custom exists which may easily be raised 

 to the rank and efficacy of law ; and that a good deal 

 of international machinery' has been created which can 

 do much more effectively and much less wastefully the 

 work that has too often been assigned to guns and 

 bombs. The failures of the Concert, on the other hand, 

 indicate that, if all wars in the future are to be obviated, 

 there is need of an international authority strong enough 

 on the one hand to crush all efforts of imperial ambi- 

 tion to extend its owTi dominion, and on the other hand 

 to handle and solve the insistent problems raised by 

 national consciousness and desire — strong enough to 

 satisfy legitimate national demands even at the cost 

 of the disintegration of old-estabhshed states ; strong 

 enough to resist and refuse the unreasonable demands 

 of pseudo-nationalities. The Concert of Europe failed 

 in the crucial cases because of its lack of real unity ; 

 because of the particularism of its members ; because 

 of its want of legislative, executive, and judicial 

 authority. If a " League of Nations " is to succeed 

 where the Concert failed, there must be congruity among 

 its members — i.e., they must all be democratic States 

 which accept the same general principles of representa- 

 tive government ; they must bind themselves in a 

 close and permanent alliance in the full consciousness 

 that in doing so they are each of them surrendering 

 into the common stock a large measure of their former 

 independence and sovereignty ; and they must main- 

 tain not only the necessary legislative, executive, and 

 judicial organs of international government, but also 

 armed forces capable of suppressing disorder and en- 

 forcing the general will. 



