S28 



DISCOVERY 



E denotes the enemy's line of (presumedly) forty-six 

 battleships. The three shorter linos denote the divi- 

 sions of the British fleet (presumedly forty strong). The 

 nearest British division of sixteen sail is to advance 

 line abreast but slantwise, in the direction which I have 

 indicated by the arrows, so as to attack and cut through 

 the enemy's line beginning from the twelfth ship from 

 his rear. " Some ships [says Nelson] may not get 

 through their exact place, but they will always be at 

 hand to assist their friends, and if they arc thrown round 

 the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the 

 business of twelve sail of the enemy." This is quite 

 clear. Nelson meant his lee division to advance line 

 abreast (not line ahead, as James in his Naval History 

 [vol. vi, pp. 470-72] perversely implies), each ship 

 cutting through the hostile line as near as possible 

 opposite her station, just as Lord Howe's fleet did at 

 the glorious First of June (1794). Nelson's lee division 

 was, in fact, to crush the enemy's rear, in a way that 

 somewhat recalls Rodney's masterly concentration on 

 the French rear off Martinique on April 17, 1780. As 

 to Nelson's other division, also of sixteen sail, he gave 

 very brief directions, merely stating that, with this 

 force and the light division held in reserve, he w^ould 

 see to it that the enemy's thirty-four ships should inter- 

 rupt as little as possible the efforts of his lee division 

 against the enemy's rear. 



He wrote little on this topic mainly because he 

 meant to adapt his measures to circumstances, but 

 also because he did not expect to attack from to wind- 

 ward. The hostile Franco-Spanish fleet in Cadiz was 

 not likely to put out thence against a westerly wind ; 

 and he therefore looked forward to a battle only when 

 the wind was easterly. Probably, too, he had outlined 

 some similar scheme, for on October i, when he 

 propounded to them the " Nelson touch," some shed 

 tears of joy and all approved. This was eight days 

 before he penned the memorandum outlined above. 



In one other respect that document does not help us 

 much. Instead of having, as he then assumed, forty 

 ships against forty-six. Nelson on October 21 had only 

 twenty-seven against thirty-three, and therefore could 

 not spare any sail to form the detached reserve division 

 which he had designed to throw into the fray wherever 

 it was most needed. He had also hoped for a stiff 

 breeze which would admit of his closing with the enemy 

 speedily. But at dawn of October 21, when he sighted 

 the fleet of Villencuve and Gravina some twelve miles 

 to the cast, the wind was very light at N.W., gradually 

 slackening and veering in the afternoon to W.S.W. 

 The direction was favourable for the approach ; but 

 the dropping of the breeze made it frightfully costly 

 to the assailants. In this connection it should be 

 remembered that bow-fire was then limited to a 

 couple of light guns, and that the whole power of 



offence lay in the broadside of from thirty-two to 

 fifty guns. 



The enemy's combined fleet mounted 2,626 guns as 

 against Nelson's 2,148 guns ; and, though as many as 

 nine of the enemy ships had drifted to leeward and could 

 therefore not fire on the British during the approach 

 of the latter, yet the twenty-four which were in Une 

 (or strictly speaking in crescent formation) had at first 

 an enormous advantage over the assailants in case 

 these adopted a perpendicular approach. 



Finally, we must remember that the circumstances 

 preceding the battle made Nelson extremely anxious 

 to close at once. The combined fleet, when sighted on 

 October 20, was leaving Cadiz and making for the 

 Straits of Gibraltar, clearly with the intention of 

 entering the Mediterranean. Later on it put about ; 

 but, when sighted again on the 21st, it was pointing 

 southwards. Afterwards it " wore ship," i.e. put about 

 before the wind, and then headed northwards as if to 

 retire into Cadiz. We now know that tliis was not 

 Villeneuve's aim ; it was a skilful tactical move on his 

 part. But to Nelson it appeared a sign of retreat to 

 Cadiz. Now our great admiral was resolved to finish 

 matters with that fleet, which he had chased to the 

 West Indies and back. Not only professional pride but 

 burning patriotism urged him on. In all probabihty 

 he still believed that that mighty array was intended 

 to cover Napoleon's projected invasion of England, for 

 on September 14, when the Victory weighed anchor at 

 Spithead, it was not yet known that the Emperor had 

 given up that scheme and was wheeling his veterans 

 from Boulogne towards the Upper Danube against 

 Austria, and though, on October 6, Nelson received from 

 home orders dated September 21, they too did not 

 expressly name the collapse of Napoleon's hopes. Also 

 there is no sure sign in Nelson's letters and despatches 

 that he heard of the change of plan. At any rate, he 

 was determined at all costs to prevent \'illeneuve's 

 retirement to Cadiz. The evidence both of Captain 

 Blackwood and of Dr. Beatty is decisive as to his 

 anxiety and eagerness on that topic. He ordered 

 Blackwood, with the frigates, to complete the destruc- 

 tion of the enemy and not to think of saving ships or 

 men ; for (says Blackwood) " annihilation to both was 

 his first object, and capture but a secondary' one." 



But how could he hope to annihilate an enemy of 

 superior force on that brief autumn day ? Mere cats'- 

 paws were playing over the water. Even with royals 

 and studding-sails set, he could not hope to close %vith 

 the enemy before noon at earliest. On the other hand, 

 the breeze failed them even more than him ; and their 

 ships, being close hauled, were forging ahead at httle 

 more than a knot an hour at the time of contact. This 

 was especially the case at their van, and this fact partly 

 excuses its commander, Dumanoir, for his extreme 



