DISCOVERY 



171 



of 1814, and conscioush- worked to avoid the pitfalls 

 into which, as it seemed, the diplomatists at Vienna 

 had sometimes fallen. 



Perhaps the greatest difference between the Confer- 

 ence of Paris and the Congress of Vienna was that at 

 Vienna, France, against whom the Great War had been 

 fought, was ultimately admitted as a full member of 

 the Congress, and took part in the negotiations which 

 led to the drafting of the various treaties of peace, 

 including the Final Act ; but at Paris, Germany was 

 not a member of the Conference, and was presented 

 only with the final project of the Treaty, and allowed 

 to make written comments on it. 



It is true that there was one obvious difference 

 between the position of France vis-d-vis the Allies in 

 1814 and the position of Germany in 1919 ; when the 

 Congress of Vienna opened, peace had already been 

 made between France and the Allies (Treaty of Paris, 

 May 30, 1814) ; but when the Conference of Paris 

 opened, Germany, having only made an armistice, 

 was still in a state of war with the Allies. Nevertheless, 

 although France in the autumn of 1814 was technically 

 at peace with the Allies, the .\llies had no intention of 

 admitting her as a member of the Congress, to take part 

 in their deliberations. For over three months Talley- 

 rand was at Vienna, and never was admitted to a session 

 of all the four allied powers (Great Britain, Austria, 

 Russia, and Prussia). It was not till January 9, 1815, 

 that the Council of Four became, through the inclusion 

 of France, the Council of Five. It is worth considering, 

 therefore, how TallejTand brought this about, and 

 whether the usually received view (which is his own 

 view) about his policy is correct. 



Talle\Tand's own account is given in his memoirs, 

 and in his letters to Louis XVIII is very flattering to 

 himself. He arrived at Vienna on September 23, 1814, 

 and found that France was isolated. It soon became 

 clear that there was going to be no Congress in the 

 usually accepted meaning of the word ; that the many 

 sovereigns and governments assembled at \^ienna were 

 not going to be consulted ; that the French were likely 

 to be left completely on one side ; and that the four 

 great Allies — Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and 

 Prussia — were going, in the persons of their pleni- 

 potentiaries, to settle things entirely by themselves. 

 Gradually, however, a rift appeared in the grand 

 alliance. Russia and Prussia on the one hand, and Great 

 Britain and Austria on the other, were found to have 

 divergent interests. Alexander of Russia meant to 

 anne.x the Duchy of Warsaw (which Napoleon had 

 created out of the former Poland) ; and Frederick 

 William III of Prussia meant to annex the whole of 

 Royal Saxony, whose king, Frederick Augustus I, 

 had been the last faithful ally of Napoleon. Frederick 

 Augustus had been taken prisonei; at Leipsic, and his 



whole kingdom had been conquered, and was now 

 occupied by Prussian troops. On the other hand, 

 Austria was all against Prussia being aggrandised by 

 the annexation of Saxony, and was not too friendly 

 (nor was Great Britain) to the Russian design of annex- 

 ing the Duchy of Warsaw. 



This divergence of interest between Prussia and 

 Russia on the one hand, and Great Britain and Austria 

 on the other, became so acute that the great Allies at 

 Vienna practically divided themselves into two camps ; 

 and open war between them was threatened. In such 

 a situation, France had obviously the opportunity to 

 hold the balance ; she had still a powerful army, 

 which might turn the scale if thrown vigorously on 

 one side. Talleyrand was just the man to use this 

 opportunity, and so well did he do so that, after receiv- 

 ing various offers from both sides, he finally accepted 

 a military alliance with Great Britain and Austria. 

 On January 3, 1815, Castlereagh and Metternich 

 signed a secret treaty with their fomier enem}', engaging 

 each one of the three to defend each other, and to put 

 150,000 men in the field if any threat of attack were 

 made against them. Thus France gained admittance to 

 the councils of two of the chief Allies at the Congress of 

 Vienna. Furthermore, she was admitted to the formal 

 meetings of all four Allies on January 9. Henceforth 

 there was no longer a Council of Four, but a Council of 

 Five. The solid front shown by Great Britain, Austria, 

 and France induced Prussia and Russia to give up 

 a good portion of their pretensions in the Saxo-Polish 

 question. In particular, the King of Saxony was left 

 on his throne at Dresden, with about half his former 

 territory, Prussia having to content herself with 

 annexing only the other half. 



Talleyrand takes great credit to himself for thus 

 raising France, so soon after her defeats in the war, 

 to be one of the five controlling powers of Europe. 

 And he writes triumphantly, and quite truthfully, to 

 Louis XVIII at Paris that the anti-French coalition 

 no longer exists: " Maintenant, Sire, la coalition est 

 dissoute, et elle Test pour toujours " {Correspondance 

 Inedite, p. 209). 



The disruption of the anti-French coalition, and the 

 admission of France to the Concert of Europe — these 

 are the gains of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna. 

 But how did France pay for these gains ? She appears 

 to have paid for them by giving up her territorial 

 security, and by putting herself in a position which, 

 in the long-run, made it inevitable for her to fight the 

 wars of 1870 and of 1914. 



The reason for making this statement is as follows : 

 On December 29, 1S14, while Prussia was still bent on 

 annexing the whole of Saxony. Hardenberg, the chief 

 Prussian delegate, sent to Metternich a specific offer 

 to indemnify the King of Saxony for the loss of his 



