DISr.OVKHY 



kingdom by scttiiif,' him up in a new kingdom on the 

 left bank of the Rliinc. This new kingdom was to 

 consist of the Duchy of Luxembourg, a part of the 

 Arclibishopric of Treves (inchiding the city of Treves 

 itself), and the southern portion of the Archbishopric 

 of Cologne, including the town of Bonn, and the 

 Abbeys of Priim, Stavelot, and Malm^dy. The 

 territory thus to be assigned had a population 0(700,000 

 (D'Angeberg. p. 1863). 



The same project (which appears really to have been 

 due to the Tsar) was put before the Council of Four in 

 the form of a draft treaty on December 30 (ibid., p. 1869). 

 Metternich and Castlereagh rejected this proposal, 

 for very obvious 'reasons — Metternich, because the 

 annexation of Saxony by Prussia would destroy 

 Austrian preponderance in Germany ; Castlereagh, 

 because the British Government did not wish to see 

 a client state of France (which was still felt to be a 

 danger to Europe) established so near to the Low 

 Countries and the mouth of the Rhine (Castlereagh 

 to Lord Liverpool, January 5, 1815, in WeUington, 

 Supplementary Dispatches, ix. 528). Talleyrand also 

 rejected the proposal when it was communicated to 

 him, and instead he accepted the offer of Castlereagh 

 and Metternich of a military alliance with GreatBritain. 

 That the project of setting up the King of Saxony on 

 the left bank of the Rhine was communicated to Talley- 

 rand, he himself acknowledges. He describes the pro- 

 ject inaletter of January 3, 1815, to King Louis XVI IL 

 In another letter, of January 6, to the King, he says 

 that the Tsar has sent Pozzo di Borgo to Paris to gain 

 Louis' consent to the project ; and he goes on to state 

 his objections to it, viz. (i) that it is against the principle 

 of legitimacy ; (2) that it would change the relative 

 strength of Austria and Prussia. To Castlereagh 

 Talleyrand expressed himself " with great propriety " ; 

 ambition and the idea of conquest inclined him to 

 accept the Tsar's project, but he desired to put a 

 restraint on any extension of the existing boundaries 

 of France (Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, January 5, 

 1815, in Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, ix. 528). 

 To suppose that Talleyrand really had these scruples 

 is mere nonsense. His whole career proves the con- 

 trary. The truth is clearly that he preferred to accept 

 the offer of the Anglo-Austrian Alliance, and thus 

 to get France, lately so defeated, into the position of 

 one of the arbiters of Europe. But at what a price ! 

 For if he had accepted the Prusso-Russian offer ; if 

 the King of Saxony had been established in a buffer 

 state on the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia would 

 never have been the danger she became on the north- 

 eastern frontier of France. The Prussian and French 

 frontiers would not have touched each other. It was 

 because Prussia was forced to give up her claim to the 

 whole of Saxony that she was indemnified by being 



allotted territory on the left bank of the Rhine. As 

 the most recent historian of France says : "It seemed 

 that France had gained a great success. However . . . 

 it had been necessary to sacrifice the tranquillity of 

 the French frontier " (Charldty, p. 40). 



It only remains to ask whether TallejTand could 

 have accepted the Prusso-Russian project, in spite of 

 the opposition of Great Britain and Austria. Castle- 

 reagh was determined to employ all the military 

 strength of Britain to defeat the proposal, but it is 

 very doubtful if he could have prevented it. For 

 Prussia and Russia had extremely powerful armies, 

 and France was by no means helpless. In a war to 

 safeguard the left bank of the Rhine, recruits would 

 have flocked to the standard as readil\' as they came to 

 Napoleon's when he returned from Elba two months 

 later. " The line of the Rhine, Belgium, Luxembourg 

 alone, would makerecruits abonrxd" {J aucourt to Talley- 

 rand in Charlety, op. cit., p. 41). 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 



The points detailed above may be gathered from the following 

 works: (i) D'Angeberg, Le Congris de Vienne et les TraiUs 

 de 1815, two vols. (Paris, 1863). This gives the protocols 

 of the Congress, and a large number of other documents. 

 (2) Mhnoires du Prince de Talleyrand, edited by the Due de 

 Broglie, vol. ii (Paris, 1891). (3) Correspondance inidite du 

 Prince de Talleyrand et du roi Louis XVIII'", edited by G. 

 Pallain, one vol. (Paris, 1881). (4) WelUngton, Supplementary 

 Dispatches, vol. ix (London. 1842). (5) Houssaye, 1815, one 

 vol. (Paris, 1899). This is a brilUant and compact work, 

 and puts the case against Talleyrand most lucidly. (6) Web- 

 ster, The Congress of Vienna, one vol. (Oxford University 

 Press, 1919). (7) Histoire de France Contemporaine, edited 

 by E. Lavisse, tome iv, by S. Charlety (Paris, 1921). 



The Daylight Micro- 

 Projector 



An Optical Apparatus, invented by a French 

 Physicist, which dispenses with the use of 

 Lantern Slides and is of invaluable use to 

 Lecturers and Others 



By G. Frederic Lees 



One of the most recent meetings of the French Academy 

 of Sciences was noteworthy on account of a com- 

 munication made by M. Branly on the subject of a 

 remarkable optical apparatus, invented and recently 

 perfected by M. Dussaud, which is calculated to render 

 invaluable assistance to lecturers and others who, for 

 the purpose of supporting their remarks by means of 

 documentary evidence, require to throw on the screen 



