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THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECT'S JOURNAL. 



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to welcome the invader. This country has not yet had an enemy 

 un its shores, and it is not to he judi^ed like France, Flanders, 

 Holland, Italy, Germany, and Spain. 



Before coming to our own ]>articular view of the question, we 

 have a few observations to make upon the military and naval part. 

 The hyjiothesis of an invasi(ni must l)e under these forms : — of an 

 army of 200,000 men, or of an army of 50,000 ; of an army witli 

 cavalry, artillery, pontoons, provisions, and train, or of an army 

 with light mounted artillery. Confining ourselves to an army of 

 50,000 under either of the latter two conditions : such an army, 

 witli 10,000 horses for cavalry, lOO or 500 pieces of artillery, liorses 

 and carriages for artillery, ammunition, provisions, and train, 

 would require greater steam accommodation, and take gi-eater time 

 in landing. It would, consequently, defeat itself, by giving more 

 time for the muster of forces against it. On the other hand, a 

 mere incursi\'e light force of 50,000 men, would be defeated by 

 want of means to overcome the usual o])stacles of delay. It would 

 want cavalry to drive off the swarms of local mounted skirmishers, 

 and to make its reconnaissances ; it would want means of crossing 

 rivers; and wlien its brigades before concentration were brought 

 in front of a regular force in position, it would want heavy cavalry 

 and artillery. If the wounded men were picked up they would 

 encumber the march, and if left beliind they would be massacred 

 by the local skirmishers hanging on the rear ; so tliat the men 

 would soon become demoralised. Three days' stay in a wasted 

 country would leave such an army, even if concentrated, without 

 provisions or ammunition, with its ranks thinned and dispirited by 

 death and fatigue. If it attem])ted to fight, every man would be 

 hutcliered. Indeed no worse fate can he wished for any man than to 

 have the command of a brigade in an army of invasion of England. 



Persons who are ignorant or ill-advised, may say that we have 

 no regular force and no military spirit in tlie country ; but those 

 who take the trouble to calculate know tliat this country has at all 

 times had great military resources, and at no time so much as at 

 the present. Turn bacli the pages of the history of England, and 

 watch the progress of preparation. The regulars in England are 

 increased by scores of thousands at a time ; sixty thousand militia 

 are embodied and used as regulars ; an army of reserve is called 

 out ; local militia are brought into the ranks of the regular army ; 

 tliree or four Iiundred thousand volunteers are enrolled ; and, in 

 1808 for example, seven hundred thousand men are in arms in the 

 islands, besides a vast fleet patrolling around. Since then, the 

 population has doubled, and that seven hundred thousand men will 

 become a million and a half, with the levy en masse to back them. 

 England, without allies, can never be lost, if only true to herself, 

 tliougli the nations of Europe should be poured on her sliores. No 

 enterprise could be more dangerous than to land troops in a 

 tliickly-peopled country, among a brave and warlike population, 

 strengthened with all the resources of knowledge and wealth. 

 For what would this to be attempted? To take the land, but to 

 fin the shores of the Atlantic, and the waters of the deep, with a 

 fierce people, who, as the Hollanders once threatened to do, would 

 take to tlieir ships and seek a new country, whence they could turn 

 upon their oppressors. 



It should be noted that it is an old regulation, always renewed 

 in time of war, that in case of invasion, all corn, cattle, and 

 people, witliin twenty miles of the shore, must be driven up the 

 country, and tlie district wasted, and efficient means are ])rovided 

 for efl'ecting this. England in time of war, aiul England in time 

 of peace, are different countries, and it is certainly not matter of 

 blame that tlie government, in the thirty-second year of peace, do 

 not harass the country with the troubles of war-time. \Fhy are 

 martello towers, shot furnaces, and batteries to decay upon the 

 coast, heavy artillery to rust, and men to be taken from their shops 

 and homes to the drill gi'ound, when all that is wanted in this way 

 can be done when the time comes .■" 



As to sudden invasion at this moment, it is a bugbear ; but we 

 are always ready to urge that a consistent system of preparation 

 for war shall be carried on : but then in our opinion the means are 

 simpler than those usually put forward, and are not to be sought 

 in the army estimates, but more immediately within the scope of 

 what are commonly called the engineering operations of the coun- 

 try. We do not advocate an increase of the standing army; we 

 have no faith in the fortification of Portsmouth, Plymoutli, and 

 other towns, as strong places ; we do not tliiuk it necessary to lay 

 down batteries on the coast, or to mount them witli heavy ai'til- 

 lery , still less do we advocate the calling out of tlie militia. We 

 may observe, that tlie government of tliis cimntry have always 

 wisely shown an indisposition to put arms into tlie hands of tlie 

 people in time of peace, because they are not under the bond of a 



feeling of hostile invasion, which in time of war prevents a mis- 

 ap|)lication of arms to interference in the civil government. 



We consider that a due attention to railways, steam navigation, 

 and tlie telegrajih system, will in time of peace be the most effi- 

 cient means of jiroviding for the defence of the country. ^Ve are 

 no longer in the position we were a few years ago, when the sudden 

 growth of steam navigation threatened military and naval men 

 with a new instrument of aggression, against which they had no 

 means of defence. Then there might have been oc(-asion for 

 alarm, had war broken out; but since then, the development of 

 the railway system has provided an adequate power of resistance ; 

 while, more recently, the estalilishment of electric telegraphs has 

 thrown the scale of preponderance in favour of tlie defensive re- 

 sources. We can no longer lie in dtmlit in wliat direction we are 

 to apply our means and make pro\ision. Wu must avail ourselves 

 of those three great branches of national enterprise which we have 

 already named. Do not let any think us over-professional in 

 taking this view of the matter, for this is the side on which the 

 Duke of Wellington looks at it. He takes his case on a steam- 

 navigation invasion, on this new development of scientific re- 

 sources ; and the fair way to meet it is to consider what resources 

 of such kind are available for tlie purposes of defence. Engineers 

 and manufacturers have created the means of invasion, and they 

 must provide us, to some extent, with the means of defence. 



Considered in reference to the defence of the nation, nothing 

 can be more unwise than that legislative interference Hliich has 

 restricted railway enterprise. Even were it true that tliere was an 

 undue competition for railways, and that capital was diverted into 

 this branch of investment, still, so far as the country is concerned, 

 it is desirable that as many railways as possible should be made. If 

 we are asked whence the capital comes for railway construction, 

 we can have an answer which springs from the very matter now 

 under discussion. In time of war, we keep a couple of hundred 

 thousand regulars and militiamen, giving no productive return. 

 In time of peace, we can employ two hundred thousand na\igators, 

 or, in reference to our present means, four hundred thousand navi- 

 gators, in making railway works. At present, out of an income of 

 fifty-five millions, thirty millions are a mere transfer of cajiital, in 

 the shape of interest on the debt ; the remainder is the effective 

 drain upon the energies of the country ; and every addition of 

 twenty thousand men to tlie military forces is a deduction of so 

 many men, and of (me million yearly, of so much productive labour 

 and capital rendered un]iroductive. AV^e can carry on such great 

 railway works wliile other countries cannot, because France, for 

 instance, keeps three hundred thousand, or four hundred thousand, 

 men under arms, — doing no good, but, on the contrary, weakening 

 its resources. 



Tlie less interference with railway legislation and management 

 the better, for it results only in public inconvenience. Had it not 

 been for this interference, we should now have had coast lines all 

 round the island, and been pro\ided with sufficient converging 

 lines from the great seats of population. As we stand now, the 

 southern ct)ast line is incomjilete, the line to the west coast is in- 

 complete, the eastern coast is neglected, and indeed tlie communi- 

 cations are left in such a state, that in time of war they will 

 require to he completed at the national expense. If erroneous 

 views of policy had not prevented it, we should have had at 

 present the following lines available for the south coast defence: — 

 A line along the scmth bank of the Thames, to Dover, to Hastings, 

 to Brighton, to Shoreham, to Fareham, to Portsmouth, and to 

 Southampton, giving the means for pouring down troops most 

 rapidly ; whereas, thi'ough the fear of competition, we are left 

 with the present inadequate accommodation. If tlie plan of traffic 

 estimates and investigations had not been followed, and parliament 

 had not undertaken the futile inquiry whether a line would pay or 

 no, we should have had lines enough made by those who are the 

 best judges how to invest their money. It is, however, the conse- 

 quence of the meddling policy, that it always reacts to produce 

 serious inconvenience to the country, without doing the slightest 

 good. 



Now that railway enterprise has been suppressed and knocked 

 down, it liecomes the duty of the government to aid the companies 

 in carrying out the necessary works. Among them are the Ijridge 

 over tiie Tliames to connect the nortli and south railways ; the 

 branch of tlie Brightcm railway from Croydon to Arandsworth ; 

 the union of the Pcn-tsmouth and Gosport lines; and the extension 

 of tlie Brighton and Hastings line through Ilye to Ashf'ord. Lon- 

 don is the seat of a population which will afford four hundred 

 thousand able-bodied soldiers, between fifteen and sixty, to be 

 poured down to any point of tlie coast between Dorchester and 

 Harwich ; and it is therefore necessary to provide accommodation 



