224 



THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECT'S JOURNAL. 



[June, 



NOTEON THE STATEOF THE NAVAL TOWER OF FRANCE, 

 CONFORMABLY WITH THE ORIGINAL TEXT. 



Note sur I'Etat des Forces Navaks ele la France, conforme au texle 

 original. Paris: Paul Masgana, Libraire, J2, Galeric de I'Odeoii, 

 1844. 



[We have availed ourselves of the deep interest now felt in the pamphlet of the Prince 

 de Joinville, oji the ste;mi power of France, to present our readers with a translation of a 

 work more peculiarly afFeciinR all connected with marine engineering. The remarks of a 

 personage, like the Prince, of some experience, considerable ability and high rank, cannot 

 fail to exercise much inttnence immediately in France, and indirectly in this country, and 

 the marine engineer is of all men most deeply concerned in the progress of the question. 

 It has been the endeavour of the translator to give as c lose an idea at nossible of the 

 author's style, particularly in the commencement where the Prince de Joinville has in- 

 dulged in declamation. This will account for the apparent want of freedom in some parts, 

 and the peculiarities in diction and punctuation.— Editor C. E. & A. Journal.] 



The object of the present note is to call the attention of serious and 

 reflecting minds to our navy. 



The country, to which the instinct of its true interests is never 

 wanting — the country requires a navy; it requires one strong and 

 powerful. This wish reveals itself by many incontestable facts. 



Only we do not well know what are the essential elements — the 

 true conditions of tliat force of which we see the necessity; we do 

 not sufficiently enquire into what is going on; we do not sufficiently 

 study the manner in which the funds voted by the Chambers are em- 

 ployed. We always live on the old prejudice, that one must be a 

 sailor, tliat is to say possess all the purely special theoretical and 

 practical knowledge to be able to understand nautical affairs. And 

 this prejudice, kept up by several circumstances, has prevented until 

 now nmny good minds from applying themselves to the study of the 

 real state of our naval power. 



The author of this note, would wish by certain fads of the clearest 

 evidence, by a few very simple calculations, and in fine bv reasoning 

 within every body's comprehension, to dissipate the obscurity in 

 which this question has been enveloped as if willingly; and if he 

 succeeds thus in rendering it accessible and familiar to each of those, 

 who may be called to decide upon it, he will consider that he has 

 rendered a true assistance to the service, to which he belongs. 



I believe that I can establish, without fear of contradiction, that the 

 popularity which the navy enjoys in France, that the ardent and so 

 often manifested design of having a strong and powerful navy, take 

 their source in a sentiment, wliich may be rendered thus: — 



** By sea as by land, we wis1i to be respected. There, as elsewhere 

 we wish to be in a condition to protect our interests, to maintain our 

 independence, to defend our honour, from whatever quarter mav come 

 the attacks which may threaten it," 



And before going further I wish that it may be well understood that 

 I do not pretend to enter upon politics in this note, devoted onlv to 

 the aff.iirs of the navy. If 1 speak of England, as of every other 

 power, it will be in no narrow spirit of animosity or even national riv:d» 

 vy,^ but only for the purpose of showing, from what passes among 

 foreign nations, what we ought to seek, what we ought to avoid.- If 

 I speak of war, it is not that I wish to see my country change the 

 benefits of peace for ruinous hazards : — No, 1 believe only tliat to 

 make peace honourable and durable it must repose on a force always 

 capable of making itself respected. 



Taking then the case of war as the groundwork for my argument, I 

 will seek an example which explains my idea, and I will suppose 

 France" obliged to defend herself against the strongest of the mari- 

 time powers — that is to name England. That assumed, and proceed- 

 ing in a manner quite abstract and quite hypothetical,'^ I enter on my 

 subject. 



1 We are bound to believe the royal author, when he asserts that ha is animated by no 

 narrow spirit of hostility or of national rivalry, but he is not only unfortunate in the time 

 he has chosen for giving any stimulant to the prevalent Anglophobia, but in the measures 

 he suggests. He could have alluded generally to the value of a steam navy in Invading 

 an enemy's country, but there was no call to make the special application, and propose 

 the invasion of England for the express purpose of destroying the conlidence of her peo- 

 pie In her insular position and maritime totnmerce. Kucha measure is no necessary con- 

 comitant in any general war, and must perforce be taken as emanating from the bitter 

 I'eeings of malice and revenge. 



2 If the author were so desirous of eschewing any feeling of political animosity, he 

 could have illustrated his position equally well by the example of the United States or 

 Holland, each of which has a commerce equivalent to that of France, and equivalent in- 

 tercstB of maritime policy. 



» It weuld be just as e;isy to suppose the United States or Holland engaged in a war 

 of defence with England, as to suppose France in such a position, yet the politicians of 

 the former countries have not, when discussing such a contingency, been seized with such 

 morbid fnntaey for humiliating the English, coute qui coute, nor attempted froc tike 

 to make their navies equivalent to that demanded by the commercial wants of England. 

 The weakest maritime powers, Naples, Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Denmark, have equally 

 the possibility of contending with the first class naval power, yet they have not the in- 

 sanity of lUlempting to make a navy of tlu- first class. 



4 This nbstract and hypothetical manner will be best appreciated by the practical ap- 

 plication, for France has just as much reason to fear a maritime war with the United 

 States as with Enghnd, and such war has occurred, while it is not so many yean ago 

 since it was again imminent, yet the Urdted States are not used to furnish forth practical 

 exemplifications. 



One fact of immense import, which has been accotnplished of late 

 years, has given us the means of raising our fallen naval power, and of 

 making it re-app^ar under a new form, admirably adapted to our re- 

 sources and national genius.^ 



This fact is the institution and progress of steam navigation. 



Our navy could only be an artificial creation when the empire of 

 the sea belonged to the one who put afloat the most seamen. Our 

 mined mercantile navy no longer furnished us seamen enough;" we 

 should have vainly struggled to avenge affronts, to eft'ace melancholy 

 remembrances;' but when even temporary success had attested the 

 courage of our seamen, numbers would in the end have stifled our 

 exertions. The steam navy has changed the face of everything ; 

 now it is our military resources which are about to take the place of 

 our impoverished naval personnel.*^ We shall always have enough 

 officers and seamen to perform the part still open to a seaman on 

 board a steamer.^ Machinery will supply the place of hundreds of 

 arms, and I need not say that we shall never want money'" to construct 

 engines, still less that we shall never want soldiers wheu the honour 

 of the country is to be maintained. 



With a steam navy, the most audacious war of aggression is per- 

 mitted by sea. We are sure of our movements, unshackled in our 

 actions. Time, weather, tide, no longer disturb us. We can calcu- 

 late to the day and hour. 



In case of continental war, the most unexpected diversions are pos- 

 sible. In a few hours the armies of France may be transported to 

 Italy, Holland, or Prussia.' ' What has been once done at Ancona 

 with a rapidity which the winds seconded, may be done everyday 

 without them, and almost against them with still greater rapidity. 



As I said just now, these naval resources become us admirably,'^ and 

 the form of war thus modified no longer leaves chances such as they 

 were, thirty years ago, between France and enemies she may meet.^" 

 So too it is curious to see to what extent the progress of steam and 

 its probable occupation excite the attention of our neighbours. 



The Duke of Wellington in his evidence before the C(uumittee on 

 Shipwrecks appointed by the Honse of Commons, said, iti relation to 

 the coasts of England opposite the coasts of France : — 



" In case of war, I should consider the want of protection and re- 

 fuge now felt would place the trade of that part of the coast, and the 

 coast itself in a very precarious situation." 



s The author who when he chooses is a man of much common sense, a« he tubae- 

 quently shows, ia at this present mnment engaged in a declamation !i la jeune France, but 

 he figures here marvellously like Scaramouch. How any one, even a Frenchman, could 

 conceive that a steam navy Is marvellously adapted to the resources and national genius 

 of France baffles conjecture. The mineral resources of France, its mines of coal, Iron 

 and copper have been too little turned to account as yet to bear this out, and certainly no 

 one but themselves will give them credit as being an engineering naUon. They have, in- 

 deed, as little genius for the engine factory as they have for tlie trader's Bhsp, and the 

 Prince's grave njipeal to liis countrymen as murine engineers puis us ridiculously In mind 

 of Elliston's application to the Duke of Newcastle to be put into parliament for one of 

 His Grace's boroughs. *' What," said the Duke, " Punch wanting to be iu Parliament; 

 Punch in Parliament' I can never stand that." So it will be said " Punch have natural 

 resourcesandanatlonal genius for iron niinesand steam engine factories !" — It Is too rich' 



6 It is to lye observed, that no benefit is gained by the French under tlie new slate of 

 aflairs, lor if their merchant navy be unable to aft'ord theui seamen, so 'hey liave not fac- 

 tories and mechanics to .ilford them marine engines, and they can compete with England 

 neither in seamen nor mechanics. 



" ' Efi'acer de trisies souvenirs.* Effacing melancholy remembrances of defeat, does 

 look marvellously like the emanation of political spleen. Englishmen do not talk of 

 effacing the * tristes souvenirs' of Walcheren, Corunna. Rosettn, Buenos Ayres, or New 

 Orleans I the Americo-English do not talk of eftacing the * tristes souvenirs' of Washing- 

 ton and the Chesapeake, ' ces sont des fails accomplis;' but a Frenchman can scarcely 

 endure the ' souvenir' of St. Vincent or Trafalgar, though we have almost forgotten them, 

 and left the monument of the victor of one battle incomplete and neglected. We say, 

 whatever may be the will of the author, his expressions are but too well calculated to keep 

 alive feelings of national animosity. 



fl Surely the author must have forgotten that the population of England, 29 millions to 

 S4, 1b not BO disproportionate to that of France, and that England has military capaciliei 

 tuo for the invasion of France, as Poitiers, Cressy and Agincouit, the victoriei of Marl- 

 borough, the days of Toulouse and Waterloo, still attest. We are not a small peoplt*, to 

 be walked over by military force, and the author confesses our superiority in naval 

 resources. It is much more easy fer the English, as they have before done, to occupy 

 Paris, tban for the French to occupy London. 



The author has here forgotten that us seaman are still necessary, though in a dimin- 

 ished proportion, on board of steamers, that this only gives England additional power, 

 instead ot diminishing it. If five thousand men now are only required, where eight thou- 

 sand formerly were requisite for the armament of a tleet, the effect can be, not to give the 

 French greater resources, but to enable the English to equip a still greater number of 

 vessels, and turn out a greater weight of metal with the myriads of men at their disposal, 

 that is to say, supposing the Engli-h with 10,000 seamen can now tit. out a force equiva- 

 lent to <;0 sail of the line, under the steam system, with the same number of men. accord- 

 ing to the Prince's calculations that 4529 men with steam are equivalent to 7767 men in 

 sailers, the English wo'dd be able to fit out a force equivalent to 100 snil of the line, so 

 that the Prince has nothing to gain on that store. Then it is.to be remembered that steam 

 will give the English better opportunities for boarding, an operaiion to which they are 

 much attached, and which they practice with success. 



1 o Money alone Is not enough to build marine engines, skill is a great thing, and the 

 French have not yet come up to the English in that. 



1 1 What right have the French to calculate on attacking Holland or Prussia, no poh- 

 tical or commercial interests are involved, which can justify such a contemplation ; but 

 as to transporting troops to Holland by stwamers we should like to know how they are to 

 get ashore, the coast of Hulland being rather to strongly defended to authorize the idea of 

 war steamers being supretqely successful. 



1 2 See note 5. 



13 See notey. 



