18-14.] 



THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECT'S JOURNAL. 



225 



In the sitting of the House of Commons on the i'Jth Feb., 1844, a 

 motion was made relative to the establishment of harbours of refuge 

 on the English coast and it is said in that motion :— " That it is the 

 duty of Her Majesty's Government to provide the means of safety, 

 not only for English trade, but also for the coasts of England. We are 

 of opinion that if at the time of the camp at Boulogne, steamboats 

 had been in use. Napoleon would easily have had the means of land- 

 ing fifteen or twenty thousand men on the coast." It was added that 

 they would not say such would have had much effect, but the effect it 

 would have produced would have been " to have destroyed that confi- 

 dence which we derive from our insular position." It concluded by 

 adjuring the legislature to take into consideration the great changes 

 effected in the last few years in steam navigation and the use which 

 might be made of it in a new war. 



The hint is a good one for England, it is also good for all those 

 whom it teaches that her strength lies in that confidence, which her 

 insular position inspires. "* 



Unfortunately we do not profit by it. 



Those cries of alarm uttered in the midst of the English Parliament 

 should have in our Chamber and in all France a salutary echo ; our 

 line of conduct should be traced to us by the hands of our neighbours 

 themselves. But it is not so ; we fold our arms — England acts : we 

 debate on theories — she carries out facts. She creates with activity 

 a formidable steam force and reduces the number of her sailors, of 

 which she has found out the powerlessness. We, who should have 

 preceded her in this reform,'^ and who at least should follow her in it 

 with ardour, — it is as much, as to number of steamers, if we have six 

 fit to be put in comparison with those of the English navy. 



It is lamentable to say this, but they lull and have lulled the country 

 with flattering words and erroneous figures ; we are persuaded and 

 they have succeeded in persuading us that we possess a strong and 

 respectable steam navy. Deplorable error, source of a still more de- 

 plorable confidence. 



I am not one of those who in the illusion of national self-love, believe 

 we are in a condition to contend at sea as equals against equals with 

 English power, but I do not on the other hand wish to be understood 

 as saying that in no case can we resist it. 



My firm opinion is that we can carry on war against any power 

 whatever, even were it England, and that, re-establishing a sort of 

 equality by the judicious employment of our resources, we can, if not 

 achieve brilliant success, at least move surely towards our end, which 

 ought to be that of maintaining France in the rank which belongs to 

 her.i" 



Our successes would not be brilliant, because we should take very 

 good care not to compromise all our resources at once in decisive 

 actions. 



But we should make way safely, because we should attack two 

 things equally vulnerable ; the confidence of the English people in 

 their insular position, and their maritime commerce." 



Who can doubt that with a steam navy strongly organized we should 

 have the means of inflicting on the enemies, coast losses and sufferings 

 unknown by a nation which has never felt all the miseries which war 

 brings on ? and at the end of these sufferings vfould come the evil, 

 equally new to her, of confidence lost. The riches accumulated on her 

 coasts and in her ports would have ceased to be in safety.'" 



And that whilst by cruisers well managed of which latter I w ill deve- 

 lope the plan, we should act efticaciously against her commerce distri- 

 buted over the surface of the sea. 



The; struggle would then no longer be so unequal. 



1 keep on reasoning on the hypothesis of a war. Our steam navy 

 would have thentwo very distinct theatres inwhichtoact; theChannel 

 first where our ports could shelter a considerable force, which issuing 

 out under cover of night would brave the most numerous and closely 



1 * If no political views of national animosity were involved, why should so mudi 

 anxiety be felt about destroying the confidence of the English in their insular position, 

 any more than destroying that of the Sicilians in their Insular positiou, or of the Hol- 

 landers in their dilies and inundations? 



15 Oh, Punch ! Punch! we shall burst with laughter— "we of France, who ought to 

 have taken the lead of England in the establishment of a steam navy !" This is almost 

 as good as the national genius of the French in the mechanical arts, for which no one gives 

 them credit. It is long since France could talk of taliiog the lead of England in anything, 

 but now that France is a tUird-rute power, raniting after Russia, the idea is rich. 



I ti What the ranli of France might once have been is one thing j in these days, when 

 she does little and next to nothing* for the advancemeut of civilization, it is a very mode- 

 rate rank, and never can be anything else while Frenchmen go to work at the wrong end , 

 grasoing at more, instead of turning to account that they have. 



I 7 Why should France attack our insular position, and our maritime commerce > We 

 do not injure France, and it is open to France by fair means, to eclipse us in maritime 

 commerce, as we and our American brethren, by fair means have eclipsed the Hollanders. 

 Lei France build up her own pinnacle of the hill to the height of ours, and not attempt 

 to pull down our pinnacle to Iier level. 



1 6 The author forgets one thing or is not aware of it, that with our immense resources 

 it would take us very little trouble to cover the coasts of England with a million ot 64 lb. 

 iron carronades, were such a provisi(m requisite. Our iron works would turn out such an 

 immense arteiiEd iu a year and hollow shot for it to boot. ; 



planted cruisers. Nothing would prevent this force from concentra- 

 ting before daybreak on any point agreed on upon the English coasts, 

 and there it would act with impunity. A few hours were quite enough 

 for Sir Sidney Smith to do an irreparable injury to us at Toulon. 



In the Mediterranean, we should reign as masters;"" we should 

 secure our conquest of Algiers, that vast field opened to our commerce 

 and our civilization.^" And then the Mediterranean is too far from 

 England ; it is not the arsenals of Malta and Gibraltar-' which could 

 maintain a steam fleet, so difficult and expensive to provision,^- and 

 always in fear of being reduced to inaction by want of fuel. Free 

 then for France to act victoriously upon that theatre ; all her plans, 

 she could accomplish them with steamers, without troubling herself 

 about sailing squadrons, of which »11 the vigilance would be deceived, 

 of which all the speed would be surpassed. 



To the steam navy and to it alone is reserved the part of patrolling 

 our coast.s, and giving notice of the approach of enemies, covering our 

 coasting trade, and opposing by main force, when it could be done, 

 any landing or bombardment, and all agressions of the enemy, 

 for it is a matter of course that the steam navy cannot give us advan- 

 tages which cannot be turned against us.''" The half of our frontier 

 is sea frontier. Formerly this vast extent of coast could be defended 

 by our land armv ; almost everywhere inacccessible or at least of dan- 

 gerous approach for sailing vessels, disembarkations were little to be 

 feared, and the important points, the great parts and those places for 

 the defence of which nature had done nothing art stepped in and put 

 them beyond attempt. Now everything is changed ; with steamers, 

 our coasts may be approached in all their vast extent; from Dunkirk 

 to Bayonne England can attempt against us all that we can attempt 

 against her. In a few hours an army embarked aboard a steam fleet 

 at Portsmouth and in the Thames would appear on some point of our 

 coast, would penetrate into our rivers, would effect a landing or would 

 destroy with shells, our cities, our arsenals and our commercial riches. 

 The rapidity of its movements would ensure its success. The French 

 army its forts and its artillery cannot be everywhere at once, and we 

 should learn at the same time the appearance of the enemy, the ac- 

 complishment of his plans, and his departure. At this moment if war 

 were declared, we should perhaps learn to-morrow the destruction of 

 Dunkirk, Boulogne, Havre, &c., which nothing can defend against a 

 bombardment. W"e should have the grief of seeing the English flag 

 flying in Brest Roads, our great arsenal, until now protected by the 

 multiplied difficulties of navigation in its neighbourhood, difficulties 

 which the employment of steamers would get rid of. 



Thus by means of a steam navy England is in a condition to threaten 

 all our coasts on the ocean, and to reign in the Mediterranean by 

 cutting off all our communications with Algiers ; she can besides closely 

 and efficiently blockade all ports, and that from to-day, if she so thinks 

 good. And to resist her, we have only one resource, only one means, 

 that which she could use against us, a steam navy. 



Well ! it must be repeated, that is the lamentable side of the ques- 

 tion ; notwithstanding all the illusions with which we love to satisfy 

 ourselves, notwithstanding all the facts asserted, all the figures put 

 forward, we have only an impotent force, a force of which ihe purely 

 nominal existence is on paper. Upon what indeed do they depend 

 to console France, and prove to her that her navy is in a respectable 

 position ? On a squadron of sailing vessels perfectly armed 1 confess 

 and certainly I am not the one to deny its merits and its glory; but if 

 it be true, that by the mere progress of things, what was the main 



1 9 A few lines lower down the author shows that he has here made a blunder, and that 

 we ought to read for " iu tlie Mediterranean we should reign as musters," " in the Medi. 

 terraneau the English would reign as masters ;" for as he subsequently says, in case of 

 war the English would immediately cut oB' the communication with Algiers, and sweep 

 the seas of the French flag. 



20 The misfortune that France has not been able to promote effectively either the com- 

 merce or civilization of Algiers, and never will on the present system. Had the English 

 had It, they would by this time have made it a most productive colony. 



21 The English have also their arsenals in the Ionian Isles, commanding the Levant 

 and Adriatic, and have too great a stake in the Mediterranean as the route to India to 

 abandon it. Supposing, an absurdity that they could not supply fuel as cheaply to Malta 

 as the French do to Toulon, they would soon find means to obtain fuei from the numerous 

 countries communicating with those seas. If it came to the worst Corfu, Zante, Cetigo. 

 and Malta must become depots fur the wood of the Wolga, the Don, the Uanube, odd 



-'2 We do not find any dilBculty with Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Isles, and are 

 not likely to do so. 



i;) This is the real (ruth of the matter, the beginning was declamation to amuse the 

 Spiders and badauds of Paris, but the naked truth lies here, France has much more to 

 fear from a steam navy than England, and has no interest in going to war. There is such 

 a thing as federalism, symptoms of it were shown in France soon after the Kevolution. 

 and it might be possible to promote the designs of local demagogues in forming the 

 United or Independent States of Lyons, Marseilles, Nantes, Bordeaux, Brittany, or La 

 Vendee. France is not yet so consolidated as to be active thus far, and the game has 

 been effectually played elsewhere. Brittany would make a nice Celtic republic under the 

 auspices of an EuBlish army of co-operation, turned more effectually to account than 

 French intrigues in Ireland. The old provinces of France might find it to their account 

 to throw off the yoke of centralization, and carry on governments on their own uccuunt. 

 This is one among many purposes in which an English stcanj navy could be turned to 

 account, as the author will see. 



