1844.] 



THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARUiJITECT'S JOURNAL. 



227 



That is not all : to form an idea of flie real force of this steam fleet, 

 we must have seen close at hand how formidable its eqaipment is, we 

 must have seen the care and skilful foresight with which everything 

 has been designed. The English war-steamers have not been designed 

 warranted good for every kind of service witliout distinction, in their 

 construction only one idea, one end has been in view — war. They 

 conjoin with a marvellous fitness for sea purposes, high speed, power- 

 ful artillery, and plenty of stowage for passenger troops. 



Yes this armament is formidable; yes, this exclusive care which 

 England devotes to increasing and perfecting tliis branch of her mari- 

 time service is a warning which we should not neglect under pain of 

 seeing some day in peril, all that is most dear to a people, the integ- 

 rity of our territory and our national honour. 



Then, I repeat, there is a very simple means we have of warding 

 off this danger, iind rendering the chances of the struggle if ever one 

 should happen; that is to arm ourselves as they arm against u?,== it 

 is to give our steam navy which still languishes in the uncertainty of 

 experiment a powerful impulsion and a large developement. With 

 the resources which this navy thus perfected would supply for attack 

 and defence, France could legitimately rely on the opinion of her 

 strength. But, I must necessarily say it, in that as in everything, to 

 do well, we must busy ourselves with it, and busy ourselves seriously 

 with it. 



Our steam navy dates from 1829 : the expedition to Algiers was the 

 theatre of its first essays. People were then struck with the advan- 

 tages it was possible to gain from it, and we hastened to cast in the 

 same mould a sufficiently large number of vessels, similar to these 

 which had served in that expedition. However such was the daily 

 increasing importance of the Algerine service, that these boats hardly 

 finished were obliged to be immediately appropriated, and without 

 ceasing urgently required, and often obliged to move without their 

 repairs being completed, they could not furnish the basis of any fruit- 

 ful experiment, or any amelioration. What they particularly wanted 

 was to be employed on stations where they could be put in comparison 

 with foreign vessels. This inconvenience together with the prejudices 

 exclusively prevailing in favour of the sailing navy, was the reason 

 why the progress of our steam fleet from 1830 to 1840 was nil. Science 

 however had progressed. The royal navy of England having the 

 leisure for experiments, and further, having under its eyes a merchant 

 steam navy in which number and competition produced daily progress, 

 turned out some magnificent vessels.-" 



The men who governed our affairs in 1810 were struck with this 

 progress, and felt the bearing of it : an energetic attempt was made 

 to give France a true steam navy, by the creation of our transatlantic 

 packets. 



Unfortunately this attempt has been the only one ; notwithstanding 

 the laudable and persevering exertions of the treasury to point out a 

 path of improvement to the steam navy by the example of its packet 

 boats, thare was an obstinacy in leaving it to vegetate, and now it is 

 not even sufficient for the wants of peace, and far from offering the re- 

 sources which it should present in war. 



And the Chambers cannot be accused of this lamentable insufficiency. 

 Every time that funds have been asked to endow France with a steam 

 navy, they have been voted with patriotic ardour. The money has 

 never had to be waited for; but it was hoped that there would be 

 some result equivalent to so much expense and so many sacrifices. 

 This result is now apparent to our eyes. By an excess of foresight 

 too common with us, the administration has thought fit first of all to 

 create repairing establishments for the new navy. In all our ports 

 now rise magnificent factories enclosed in stately monuments. These 

 factories are for the purpose of repairing the damage, and providing 

 for the wants of the steam navy, and this navy is only in its infancy. 



However as these large factories cannot be left without employ- 

 ment nor the workmen without work ; as besides in the nature of 

 things, all the steamers we have are employed at Toulon, and that 

 there are only steamers to repair at that place, what has been done 

 with the factories constructed in the ports of the ocean? They have 

 been employed in manufacturing engines, instead of giving the con- 

 tracts for them, as a premium to private industry.^" 

 We had already Indret and its costly productions. Was it neces- 



2 8 Why should the author iningloe that the English or nnyone else arm against "us," 

 against France. France is not a power so formidable as to excite English or Americo- 

 English suspicion, and the latter nations have quite enough to do in looking alter their 

 interests without troublinn themselves about France. 



20 This is the secret ot naval supremacy, the French have always begun at the wrong 

 end, instead of beginning by nialdng a strong miliiary navy, it should be by making a 

 strong merchant navy. 



3 o The advice of the author is here very good, it is by the developenient of private in- 

 dustry that Fiance is to be advanced, and England will never grudge the real advance- 

 ment of France, nor even its superiority should it be gained by fair means, ^nd in con- 

 formity with the great interests of mankind and of civilization. 



sary to add to this luxury of establishments ? Was it requisite to 

 employ the money destined for the increase and improvement of the 

 fleet, ill raising monuments of which the immediate utility is far from 

 being demonstrated ? 



We have always been inclined to increase without limit the im- 

 moveables of the navy, to the detriment of everything efficacious and 

 active in the department.^' It would be good to try the other plan, 

 and I am convinced that we should readily find the means of arming a 

 true steam fleet and encouraging a useful trade, by requiring from 

 private establishments, fine and good machines, such as they knov? 

 how to produce. 



If I were here to trace the true state of our steam navy, if I were 

 to say that of this number of forty-three steamers afloat borne on the 

 budget, there are not six fit to compare with the English vessels, [ 

 should not be believed, nnd Isliould still have asserted the strict truth. 

 The greater number of our vessels belong to that class good in 1830, 

 when they were turned out, but now, must certainly much behind pre- 

 sent improvement. These vessels subjected in the Mediterranean 

 to a navigation without repose, have almost all reached a premature 

 old age. As I poii;ted out just now they are no longer sufficient for 

 the service of Algiers and the political missions on which they are 

 sent, for want of better vessels. The officers who command them 

 blush at seeing themselves weak and powerless, I will not say along- 

 side the English only, but the Russians, the Americans, the Dutch, tne 

 Neapolitans, who hive better steamers than ours. 



I shall be accused of decrying with pleasure our war resources, if I 

 did not reckon our transatlantic packets and those belonging to the 

 post otiice. Doubtless there is some use to be expected from these 

 vessels, but in the first place they do not belong to the navy, which 

 does not require them in vime of peace, and it is deceiving ourselves 

 besides if we believe that by their construction and equipment we can 

 at once appropriate them to their own service and that of war. (See 

 Appendix A.) 



The objection of expense is raised against the general employment 

 of a steam navy. 



My first answer will be that so far as precautions are to be taken for 

 the guard of her power and the defence of her territory, France has 

 often proved that she did not reckon expense. But I accept the ob- 

 jection, and I allow that engines and boilers cost very dear ; I add 

 only that nothing obliges ns to pay all the expense in a single year, 

 for in the interest of such an extensive manufacture, it would be ad- 

 vantageous to distribute the expense over several consecutive budgets. 

 We must consider then that engines properly kept in order will last 

 a very long while, from 20 to 25 years, and that if the boilers are worn 

 out sooner, it is possible to render them less costly, by substituting 

 copper for sheet iron ; not but the first metal is dearer than the other, 

 but it lasts longer, and after the apparatus is worn, still preserves some 

 value for sale of old material. 



1 have endeavoured to m»ke some calculation as to the cost of 

 establishment and maintenance of the material of steamers compared 

 with sailers ; unfortunately I have not been able to give to these cal- 

 culations all exactness requisite, having no ether basis to furnish them 

 than hypotheses ; the official publications only exhibit uncertain data 

 in this respect. Baron Tupinier in a work full of interest* has formed, 

 with the same purpose as I have, some calculations which are only 

 learned probabilities, and which, like mine, are exposed to error in 

 their basis, since they only rest on supposition. 



In this unfortunate impossibility of giving results mathematically 

 accurate, 1 have left out of the account the cost of the material of the 

 steamers, confining myself to the observation that sailing vessels have 

 also a materiel which wears out and at all times, while that of steamers 

 only wears while the engine is going and doing work. 



I have therefore taken the pay and clothing of the crews, and the 

 consumption of fuel, the only appreciable data, and from these data I 

 have drawn this conclusion, that a second rate entails an expense 

 equivalent to that of four vessels of 220 h. p. 



That therefore our present fleet at Toulon costs as much as a fleet 

 would cost of 



5 steam frigates of 450 h. p. each. 

 22 steam corvettes of 220 h. p. 

 11 steam boats of 160 h. p. 



38 steamers capable of transporting 20,000 troops. 



I now ask to compare the services, which on the one hand could be 



rendered by 8 liners, 1 frigate and 2 steamers, slow and imcertain in 



their movements, and absuibing an effective of 77ii7 seamen; and on 



the other hand 38 steamers manned with 452'.) seamen and capable of 



3 1 This is a very good hint, and shows up a very prevalent feature of French adminis- 

 tration. 



* Cousiderations sur la Marii-e et son budget. 



