228 



THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECT'S JOURNAL. 



[JuNK' 



ransporting 20,000 troops. Let war come, and we must disarm the 

 former of these squadrons, while the second is always serviceable. 

 (See Appendix B.) 



I could have dwelt further upon tliese considerations relative to a 

 steam n..vy, but I limit myself to general ideas, leaving to others the 

 care of enforcing my views, and bringing out all thev suggest. I be- 

 lieve however that I have demonstrated in a satisfactory manner that 

 a steam fleet is alone good at the present day for offensive and de- 

 fensive war, and alone good for protecting our coasts and acting against 

 those of the enemy, and for seconding efficiently the operations of our 

 land armies. It now remains forme to speak of a means of action, 

 which we should have to employ in case of a war with England. 



Without having been engaged in the long struggles of the French 

 navy with tlie English navy in the time of the revolution and the em- 

 pire, we may have studied its history and gathered its experience. 

 it is a fact well ascertained now that if during those twenty years the 

 war of fleet against fleet was always fatal to us, almost always also the 

 cruises of our corsairs were successful. Towards the close of the em- 

 pire divisions of frigates, issuing from our ports with the mission of 

 skimming the sea without compromising themselves against an enemy 

 superior in number, inflicted considerable loss on English commerce. 

 To touch that commerce (hen, is to touch the vital principle of Eng- 

 land is to strike her to the heart.=- 



Until ihe time of which 1 spoke our blows did not strike there, and 

 we allowed the spirit of English speculation to increase by the war its 

 prodigious profits. The lesson should not be lost to us now, and we 

 ought to put ourselves in a condition, at the first shot which would be 

 fired to act |jowertully enough against English trade to shake its con- 

 fidence. This end then France would obtain by stationary cruisers 

 skilfully distributed in every quarter of the globe. ^^ in the channel 

 and tlie Mediterranean this part might very well be entrusted to 

 steamers. Those which are employed as packets during peace would 

 from their high speed make excellent corsairs in time of war. They 

 might come up with a merchantman, plunder it, burn it and escape 

 even war steamers, of which the progress would be retarded by their 

 heavy construction. 



It could not be thus on distant seas; there it is frigates which must 

 be specially destined as cruisers, and although apparently there is no- 

 thing new in what I am about to say, I would wish to call attention to 

 this point. 



My opinion with regard to frigates is not the same as with regard 

 to liners. Far from reducing the number I should like to increase 

 them ; in peace as in war, good service can be got out of them, and 

 they would be obtained increase of expense by only distributing our 

 stations in a better manner.^' 



The frigate alone appears to me proper to represent France at a 

 distance, and moreover tlie frigate of the most powerful dimensions. 

 It only can, in eft'ect with an adequate force and a numerous crew 

 carry provisions enough to keep the sea for a long time togetlier; it 

 only can, as I shall hereafter point out, bend itself equally to the wants 

 both of peace and war. A thousand or two thousand leagues distance 

 from the shores of France 1 admit of no distinction between these two 

 conditions; distant stations, which mav learn of a war some months 

 after it has been declared, should always be constituted on the most 

 formidable footing. Motives of economy should here disappear be- 

 fore greater and move elevated ideas. We must never by a ruinous 

 parsimony, allow the forces of France to be sacrificed or even com- 

 promised. 



Until now our distant stations have been composed of a frigate 

 bearing the flag of the admiral in command and of several corvettes 

 or brigs. Two reasons have produced this result ; the demands of 

 consuls, always desirous of having a vessel of war within reach of their 

 residences; and secondly the great reason of economy so often ap- 

 pealed to, which has caused the force and class of vessels to be re- 

 duced, which could not be reduced in number. 



It follows that wishing to be everywhere, we have everywhere been 

 weak and impotent. 



It IS thus that we send 40 gun frigates* with a crew of 300 men 



3 2 Ttiis is another exemijlilicalion of the author's soi-disant non-polilical bias. Like 

 most other Frenchmen he is however wrong in his view, it is not toninterce whicll is the 

 vital principle of Knyluuti, but the spirit of energy and enterprise of which comniwvce is 

 the exttrnul nianifesution. The aullior might destroy our silips, chectc our commerce, 

 and yet lt.ave the vitals of Knyland's power unscathed. 



ns This amiable i^roposition has excited much attention and much reprobation. The 

 author however forgets that there is hardly a part ol the world where the English flag 

 does not fly, and where England has not resources at hand to check those cruisers. In 

 all our colonies now, even in Australia, are merchant steamers, which might be found a 

 nuisance even to French frigates. 



a* It will be observed that this JB the American system. The Americo-English have 

 only 10 ships cJ the line t4 building), but have 10 frigates (4 building). They seem how- 

 ever to be increasing their squadron of the line. 

 ;^ * Thui on the Brazilian and l.a Plata station we have a frigate bearing the flag of the 



where England and the United States have frigates of 50 guns and 

 more, with 500 men aboard. Each is however only a frigate, and if 

 it happened that they one day met in conflict it would be said every- 

 where that a French frigate had been taken or sunk by an English or 

 American frigate ; and although the force would not have been equal 

 our flag would be no less humiliated by a defeat. 



As a principle I should say that stations should be formed each of 

 two or three frigates of the greatest dimension. These frigates would 

 move togetlier under the orders of an admiral, and would profit thus 

 by all advantages of navigation in squadron. Constantly at sea com- 

 mander and seamen would learn to know and appreciate each other, 

 and we should not reproach our admirals with tliat lazy immobility 

 which seems to nail them to the head quarters of their station. Every- 

 where where this naval division would show itself, and it sliould be 

 constantly engaged in going over the extent of its district, it would 

 be seen strong and respectable, having the means of repressing imme- 

 diately the irregularities of foreign governments, without those costly 

 appeals to the mother country of which Mexico and La Plata have 

 given us such lamentable examples. 



We should no longer have those small vessels disseminated over the 

 points where our diplomatic agents reside, and so fit by their very 

 weakness, to bring down insults which our flag should know how to 

 avoid, but never sufter. 



We should no longer be exposed to see at the commencement of a 

 war, the greater part of these vessels of weak build snapped up with- 

 out firing a shot by the enemy's frigates. 



Far from that we should have on all points of the globe divisions of 

 frigates, quite ready to follow in the track of those glorious squadrons 

 which have so nobly contended for their country in the Indian seas. 

 They would cruise around our colonies, around those new points seized 

 in distant seas by a provident policy, and destined to serve as a basis 

 to their operations,^' as well as to become the refuge of our priva- 

 teers. 



I may add that this manner of representing the country abroad would 

 be much more advantageous to our commerce, than the manner in 

 which we now do it. In etfect, the arrival of a squadron provided 

 with all the means of making itself respected would be much more 

 feared than the constant presence of a small vessel, which people are 

 habituated to see and soon forget.^^ Either I deceive myself or this 

 visit always expected, always imminent, would be for French interests 

 a powerful protection, and our merchantmen would find much more 

 benefit from the influence of our flag thus shown from time to time in 

 countries which form an incomplete idea of the strengtli of France, 

 than from the presence often annoying for them of one of our small 

 vessels of war. 



It may be observed that I have not spoken of steamers for those dis- 

 tant stations; I believe that we sliould only employ them incidentally, 

 and with the determination to shut them up in our colonies on the 

 first rumour of war. 



In general, it is necessary that our steamers sliould never leave our 

 coasts except for such a distance as allows of regaining them without 

 a fresh supply of fuel. I argue always on the hypothesis agreed on 



admiral ccininiauding the station. The English and American Governments have also a 

 frigate; but here is the respective force of these ships. 



France Africaine 40 guns 311 men. 

 Erghmd Alfred 50 „ 445 „ 

 Aiueiica Kaiilau* IJO ,, 470 ,, 

 Tile rest of this station is composed ol small vessels, aud there also we arc in inferiority 

 in number aud rating. 



Another example^ Our station of Bourbon and Madagascar, destined to protect our 

 infant establishment at Wayotte aud support the Catholics of Abyssinia, of whom the 

 friendship preserves to France one of the keys of the Ked Sea,a 5 js thus composed ;— 

 1 corvette '22 guns. 

 1 brig 20 „ 

 1 Gubarre (transport), 

 1 steamer of itiO h. p. 

 Whilst the English station at the Cape.su jg composed of ;— 

 1 frigate of 60 guns. 



1 „ 44 „ 



2 corvettes of lili „ 

 '2 brigs of 16 „ 



1 steamer of 320 h. p. 



* The Raritan is rated as a 44 gun frigate. — Translator. 



as This is a specimen of French policy and glory. IVIadagascar and Blayotte ! aggres- 

 sion and not civilization— and intrigues with the Catholics of Abyssinia, these are the 

 staple. What interest France has in the Red Sea cannot be well conceived. The Indian 

 trade of France is not worth mentioning, and requires no key of the Ued Sea for its de- 

 velopement. 



a 6 The English have not only in that neighbourhood the station at the Cape, but those 

 of Aden, Bombay aud Ceylon, which would clear oft" the French settlements in a twinkling. 

 The English require these stations for the demands of their commerce and steam naviga- 

 tion. 



3 ' This is sufficient as a hint. The French have invaded our territories in Tahiti, 

 Hawaii and New Zealand, and those of our ally in the Comoro Isles, not for the legitimate 

 purposes of carrying on their own trade, but with the more banditti-likii end of preying 

 on onrs. 



as Why France should so constantly desire to make herself feared, we think it should 

 have been for the author to explain. 



